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ABSTRACT

The term “Holocaust” implies a narrative of religious sacrifice: the impulse to construct
coherent stories out of the complex of events and experiences in the ghettoes and death
camps springs from a desire to find meaning in what might otherwise seem meaningless.
Recalling Dante’s quest to comprehend a European social order gone astray, three
prominent framers of Holocaust narratives in the post-War era became deeply engaged
with the allegorical project of the Commedia. This thesis examines Primo Levi’s
typological use of Inferno in his memoir Se Questo E un Uomo (1948); Andrzej Wajda’s
political engagement with Purgatorio in his film Kanal (1956); and Peter Weiss’s judicial
preoccupation with Paradiso in his play Die Ermittlung (1965). Their works reveal not
only how Dantean allegory can function as an interpretive tool for understanding
Holocaust narratives but also how modem understandings of the Commedia have been
expanded by their readings o f it.

Key words: allegory, Andrzej Wajda, Auschwitz, contrapasso, Dante Alighieri,
Holocaust, justice, Peter Weiss, Primo Levi, resistance literature, testimony, Warsaw
Ghetto Uprising,
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INTRODUCTION
On the Brink of an Abyss

.

' ■: .

''

■■

•

•I • '

Primo Levi leads us into his harrowing memoir of the Holocaust, Se Questo È un Uomo,
not (as we might expect) from the beginning of his life, with a calm account o f the years
leading up to the Nazi persecutions, but with a jolt in medias res, thrusting us with
himself and his fellow .Jews into the pitiless enclosure of the wagons bound for
Auschwitz.

Like the captives, we suddenly lose our citizenship in ;the world of the

familiar and become unfamiliar to ourselves, dehumanized, mere cargo en route to
“nulla.” The initiatory experience of the wagons is described

~

; Proprio cosi, punto per punto: vagoni merci, chiusi dall’esterno, e dentro
uomini donne bambini, compressi senza pietà, come merce di dozzina, in
viaggio verso il nulla, in viaggio all’ingiu, verso il fondo. Questa volta dentro
siamo noi. (Se Questo 14)
[Exactly like this, detail for detail: goods wagons closed from the outside,
u: with men, women and children pressed together without pity, like cheap
merchandise, for a journey towards nothingness, a journey down there,
towards the bottom. This time it is us who are inside.] (Woolf 16-7)1
Strategically merged in the expansive pronouns of Levi’s punctilious narration are “they”
who were forced into the wagons, forced to become insiders to the subsequent horrors of
the camps, and “we” who are looking back at them from a safe historical distance - most
of us as horrified outsiders—readers without borders, as it were, who have placed
s

ourselves under his authorial guidance and are freely entering into an intimate

1 All English translations o f Se Questo È un Uomo are from: Levi, Primo; Survival in Auschwitz: A Nazi
Assault on Humanity, trans. Stuart W oolf (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). The Roman numerals
following.“W oolf ’ refer to the page number(s) on which the excerpted passages appear in the translation.
Quotations from the original Italian text will be cited with the abbreviation Se Questo followed by the page
number(s) in Roman numerals.
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understanding of their experiences. We should not be surprised if this journey “towards
the bottom” feels like a retracing of allegorical steps. The feeling is more than the result
of obsessive historical retrospection or revisionism. It is preeminently a literary effect,
the outcome of Levi’s relentless typological engagement with Dante. :'
The confining interiority o f the wagons clearly functions as Levi’s Limbo. Just as
Dante’s Limbo is densely populated— a “selva di spiriti spessi’ [wood of thronging
spirits] {Inferno 4.66)2— so the wagons are packed with people, forced by their sheer
numbers rather than by any sense of social formality or moral rectitude to stand upright as
they are conveyed towards ghostly erasure by the mechanism of a terrible unseen power.
Levi’s asyndeton “uomini donne bambini” aptly evokes the dire compression of the
doomed population into a tiny space, even as it recalls and reverses the-order of Dante’s
more expansive phrasing “d’infanti e di femmine e di viri” [of infants and of women and
of men] {Inf 4.30) which had poignantly revealed to the pilgrim-poet the careful
preservation of classical social hierarchies based on gender and age among the vast and
i

varied crowds of the First Circle. The loss of connecting words in Levi’s hasty
demographic survey seems to anticipate the destruction of all such ancient hierarchical
connections, heralding the further reduction of the captive men-women-children into a
faceless herd, a compacted heap. The presence of “bambini” in the crowded wagons is
reported almost offhandedly, as a simple matter of fact, as if it were not an especially
appalling sight to Levi at the time of his capture and deportation. In this respect he also
resembles Dante-pilgrim, whose sighting of the unbaptized babies in Limbo is passed

2 All quotations and translations from the Commedia are drawn from the Hollander edition (2000-2007). In
citing Dante’s works throughout this volume, I have followed the list o f abbreviated titles established by
Richard Lansing in The Dante Encyclopedia (2000), ix. For example: Inferno {Inf.)-, Purgatorio {Purg.)\
Paradiso {Par.). Since the quotations and translations appear within the same volume, and both as poetry, I
will only be citing the quotation once by line number.
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over as soon as it hits his consciousness, giving rise at the time to no rebellious
lamentations or agonized theodicies. Having reached “la valle d ’abisso dolorosa / che
’ntrono accoglie d’infiniti guai” [upon the brink of an abyss of suffering / filled with the
roar o f endless woe] (Inf. 4.8-9), both authors leave us laconically on edge, rhetorically
unsettled by what is not said about the coming “journey down there.”
Levi’s concern with detail, with what is described about the “journey down there,”
is also shared by Dante in his observations of Limbo. Dante explains to the reader that he
gazes intently around Limbo to identify his location (Inf. 4.5-6). Since Dante-poet is
telling the reader this, he intends the gaze to serve as a way to document at a later tim e.
what he has seen, just as Levi tells the reader that his description is “proprio cosi, punto
per punto.” This concern with detail is also demonstrated through Levi’s use of the firstperson plural to include himself in the hoard of people being loaded into the goods
wagons. Dante-poet similarly uses the first-person plural for the same inclusion in the
!

journey (Inf. 1.1). Levi and Dante are both descending to commence their journeys and,
as writers, they speak in the first person in order to include themselves in the ordeal about
which they are going to write. This inclusion allows Levi license to recall his own
Limbo-like experiences o f being trapped in the wagons headed towards Auschwitz.
Unlike the souls in Limbo who remain imprisoned there, Levi is not stationary; the
wagons are hurtling forward towards internment, much like Charon’s boat which ferries
the condemned souls across the river to their assigned circles of punishment (Inf 3.82111). Levi has conflated these two episodes from Inferno in a manner that casts him in
the double role of a virtuous shade in Limbo and a damned soul en route to deeper
torments in the Abyss.

4
Since Levi is writing from “dentro” and the wagons are identified with Limbo, he
repopulates this Dantean area with Hebrews (before the Harrowing of Hell the Hebrew
worthies resided in Limbo). Levi returns the Hebrews to this place where the original
Hebrew worthies were not to be condemned but to wait for deliverance. Ironically, for
Levi’s Hebrews, there will be no deliverance to Heaven, only condemnation and
judgment on the ramps of Auschwitz. Levi includes himself inside these wagons, inside
Limbo waiting for deliverance, but then ironically excludes the wagons (in their
typological relationship to Charon’s boat) from salvation. In Inferno 3, from the
viewpoint of Dante-pilgrim, Charon seems to be a judgmental officer in the infernal chain
of command and not a member of the Damned himself. However, as a demon, he is no
less damned than the shades in his boat. In so far as he corresponds to-the Nazi drivers,
his demonic status effectively demonizes them. Levi’s explicit inclusion of himself
inside the wagon3 also implicitly suggests the view outside of the wagon, the vantagepoint o f the judge, in his case the Nazis on the ramp. The condemned souls in Inferno are
there because o f their sins, however, whereas the Jews find themselves in the similar
situation for reasons that seem incomprehensible to them.
This ironic inclusion which also implies exclusion surfaces from a typological
connection to Dante’s Inferno. As an allegorist, Dante also enriches the reader’s
experience by using ironic binaries, which can be revealed through a meditation of
Inferno 4. One ironic binary is that of darkness and light. Here, light means both the
physical sensation and intelligence and darkness means either the absence of light or
spiritual darkness. Dante has just begun his journey and is guided through Hell because

3 Levi also identifies with Dante-poet however as he also returns and writes o f his journey through his
Hell— Auschwitz.
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he has strayed from the right path, from the path of religious correctness. Limbo is his
introduction to Hell and he is greeted by the great authors who lived and died before
Christ’s crucifixion. Dante, as a poet, is first introduced to other poets whose works he
would not only know well but also revere (and does revere as his allusions to them
confirm). These souls are not raised to Purgatory or Paradise but are condemned to
Inferno for all eternity. The eclipsing of their mental acuity because of spiritual darkness
is heightened also by the presence o f the unbaptized babies. Like the pilgrim, the reader
has to contend with the horrific image of babies in Hell and also the irony of the noble
poets appearing trapped in the same location as these inarticulate innocents. The most
informative example of this binary is Virgil. He comes to rescue Dante from the Dark
Wood and tells him that since he has been a guide previously, he will escort Dante
through the Inferno. While Dante-pilgrim and Virgil are unaware of this in Inferno 4,
Virgil will not be harrowed from Hell after his duty as guide has finished. His ignorance
of Christianity, an accident of his birth date, tragically condemns him to internal (as well
as eternal) exile as a literally “marginalized” shade in Limbo.
The second binary entails inclusion and exclusion. Dante makes the reader aware
of it by positioning Limbo inside Hell yet also outside the circles of corporeal torment.
Dante-pilgrim’s initial state in Inferno 4 is of a suspended consciousness; he is asleep. „•
Dante-poet describes his pilgrim self waking up to a large thunderclap (1-3). The chaotic
masses he describes upon first hearing the souls make it hard to understand how he could
have fallen asleep at all. Dante is inside Limbo but seems to be on the outside, unaffected
originally by the conditions of Limbo but soon growing aware of the psychological
torment o f its inhabitants. His insider/outsider status in the First Circle is further
intensified by what Virgil has told him while they were both outside the Gate of Hell:

6
\

from Beatrice’s instructions to his guide he knows that he isimpelled by higher powers to
enter into Limbo en route to the Abyss.
The souls in Limbo are not tortured by demons like the Damned in the lower
circles of Hell {Inf. 4.40-2). *The First Circle is also the location of the only known (and
\
witnessed) rescue of souls from Hell; the pilgrim learns that Virgil has seen Christ during
the Harrowing when the Hebrew worthies were removed from Limbo. Virgil is also
trapped in the middle of this binary. While he is presented as the wise guide who is able
to leave his circle with Dante, the only one to do so since the Harrowing, he is unable to
remain distant from Limbo and returns even though he believes there is a possibility for
his release. Dante-poet recognizes his own unique situation when he notes that Dantepilgrim is first accepted as one of the great poets only to be led beyond them into the
depths of Hell {Inf. 4.148-50). He includes himself originally within the elite company of
these poets only to exclude himself by departing from them, which serves to highlight the
contrast between inside and outside Limbo. As a poet writing of his own pilgrimage,
Dante himself participates in the inclusion and exclusion binary. While Dante-pilgrim
experiences the journey, it is Dante-poet who writes of this experience. Both characters
i

are Dante but they are not identical: Dante-poet has experienced the entire afterlife and
reshaped his relation to the world accordingly, while Dante-pilgrim has not. The project
of the Commedia, in part, is to bring these two Dantes together, to resolve the tension
between the wayward pilgrim and the Poet who is out to reform the World.
These Dantean ironies are transferable to the Holocaust4 as demonstrated through
an analysis o f how these binaries function in Se Questo E un Uomo. The first binary, the

4 For this project the term “Holocaust” will be used in a broadly inclusive sense to refer not only to the
genocide o f approximately six million European Jews under the Third Reich but also to the persecution of
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opposition of darkness and light, plays out in Levi’s allegorical association of physical
illumination with mental acuity. Levi describes being enclosed in the darkness o f the
/

goods wagon, which has no windows and no way of escape. The people with whom he is
travelling share only the common characteristic of being Jewish prisoners of the Nazi
regime. While he is an educated man, that intelligence is rendered useless in the goods
wagon—-survival depends not on mental capabilities but on physical strength.
Surrounded by “uomini donne bambini,” the Jews sealed in the wagons have no choice
but to coexist. Like the great intellectuals who are humiliated in Limbo by having to keep
company with mere babies amid the thronging ,masses of male and female shades, Levi is
unable to reconcile his status as an educated man with the humble presence of mothers
and babies in the wagons.

:

The darkness Dante describes in Inferno 4, however, is not the same darkness
implied by Levi’s sinister phrase “viaggio verso il nulla.” The Jews are being taken to
Auschwitz in order to be destroyed. The Nazis want to remove Jews from history and so
no longer treat them like human beings: they are packed into goods wagons like objects to
be used and discarded. This dehumanization of the Jews is demonstrated through the
mercantile language present in Levi’s account of the deportation but not in the language
of Inferno 4. Not only does Levi describe the wagons as “vagoni merci” but he also
describes himself and the other Jews “come merce di dozzina.” While Dante describes a
darkness, he certainly does not mean that there is nothing in Limbo, but that the darkness
)
prevents him from seeing the landscape and inhabitants there. Levi’s change of diction in
millions more in various other groups targeted by the Nazis during World War II (e.g. disabled persons,
homosexuals, Romani, Sinti, Soviet prisoners-of-war, Jehovah’s Witnesses, non-Jewish Europeans who
lived in fear o f imprisonment, torture, or execution because o f their efforts to resist Hitler’s genocidal
1
policies). Under this definition, a conservative estimate o f the total number o f victims is around twelve
million.

r
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the context of the Dantean binary between darkness and light makes the description of his
trip to Auschwitz horrific because the reader realizes that unlike the ghosts in Limbo, he
is a living soul scheduled for complete erasure from the human race’ The souls in Inferno
are treated as intelligent beings, even though they are condemned to eternal damnation.
While the deportations to Auschwitz have been described many times by various
survivors, what Levi as writer would know is that the trip to Auschwitz (if survived) was
relatively mild compared to survival within the camp. While Levi experiences horrors he
could never imagine within the wagon, the state of waiting to arrive at Auschwitz is eerily
similar to Dante’s surprise after leaving Limbo and entering Hell proper where he passes
out after witnessing the first infernal punishment (Inf. 5.142). Just as Dante is described
as sleeping at the beginning of Inferno 4 and his entrance is therefore forced, the trip in
the goods wagon is also forced. Levi has no choice but to accept his deportation and
begin his journey, unaware of whether he will survive or not. Though the absence of
consciousness Dante describes is not mentioned explicitly in Levi’s narrative, a Holocaust
survivor could sympathize with that condition: the deportations were widely discussed,
rumours of the death camps surfaced continually, and there were even a few escapees of
death camps. Usually the Jews went to their scheduled deaths with an eerie orderliness.
There is no chaos at the train tracks when the Jews are loaded into the goods wagons,
“soltanto uno stupor profondo” {Se Questo 14) [only a profound amazement] (Woolf 16).
While Dante’s account of the pilgrim’s unconscious entrance into the Inferno brings to
the fore the infernal irony of his insider/outsider status, Levi’s testimony about the
stupefied condition of the Jews reveals their utter exclusion from the social order
established to realize (and to conceal) the murderous intentions of the Nazis.

9
By including Dante-pilgrim in the circle of great poets only to have him break ,
away from their company, Dante-poet demonstrates his unique position as the poet who
will surpass the works of those he has just met. Levi notes that, of the forty-five people in
his wagon, “quattro soltanto hanno rivisto le loro case” (Se Questo 15) [only four saw
their homes again] (W oolf 18). The number four in this context seems especially
significant. While Levi is echoing Inferno 4 in the description of his journey, he seems to
include himself not as one of the two poets who depart from the group of six, but as one
of the four poets who remain in Limbo. In Levi’s case, remaining as one of four
ironically portends his deliverance since these are the four Jews who ultimately survive.
i
Yet from the guilt-ridden perspective of a survivor, inclusion in such a group can
strangely feel like an exclusion from the infernal life of the majority of-Jews in the camps.
Levi returns from Auschwitz and writes Se Questo E un Uomo in order to tell the world
what has happened to him, just as Dante returns and writes the Commedia as a testimony
of his pilgrimage. Yet as a survivor Levi is deeply conscious of his position in a tiny
minority lacking guidance on how to navigate through their memories of survival. Dante
has divine inspiration and Virgil as his guide. Levi’s memoir redeploys the Dantean
\

binary o f inclusion and exclusion through ironic reversals of the typological
correspondences to events and characters in Inferno 3-4 to reveal how a Holocaust
survivor would feel shockingly without supernatural guidance and would therefore be
inclined to identify himself with the abandoned poets rather than with Dante-pilgrim.
Whereas Dante uses the first-person singular to denote his unique position of sole
“survivor,” Levi uses the first-person plural instead. While Levi makes note that “questa
volta dentro siamo noi” and therefore includes himself within the wagon, he also excludes
himself from the wagon by being one of the four survivors.
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Perhaps by identifying himself with one of four left behind, Levi also parallels his
authorial position with Virgil’s ironic placement in Limbo. Though Virgil is normally
restricted to Limbo, Beatrice’s intervention permits him to move freely through the
Inferno and up Mount Purgatory with Dante. When Beatrice returns at the top of the
mountain, Virgil once again “has disappeared” to the First Circle. While he is a knowing
guide he is still unable to escape damnation. In light of Virgil’s return to Limbo, did Levi
as a survivor see himself in the role of the knowing guide who .is ultimately entrapped in.;
his Limbo-like memories of Auschwitz? When Levi came to write Se Questo E un Uomo
from his home after the war, had he really escaped his experiences,5 or was he thrown
back into Limbo the moment his knowledge became “useless” or a better guide came
along? Dante uses the inclusion/exclusion binary to define his uniquely privileged
position as the protagonist and author of the Commedia. By not doing the same, Levi
suggests that his status as a Holocaust survivor is not a privileged position but an
unfortunate result of a failed Nazi regime. Perhaps he is also suggesting that it is difficult
to be a testimonial author without being trapped anew in the contents of the testimony.
Another reason for Levi’s ironic cancellation of his identification with Dante is
the extreme contrast between the totalizing perspective adopted by the poet of the
Commedia, and the inevitably partial viewpoint of a survivor of the Holocaust. As a
survivor, Levi did not experience everything possible in the camps. Aside from not
experiencing the gas chambers personally, he was never a member of the
Sonderkommando.6 When Dante excludes himself from the group of poets in which he

5 Elie W iesel suggests that while Primo Levi lived for forty years after surviving Auschwitz, he never left
Auschwitz and his death was a “death in Auschwitz forty years later” (Cicioni 171).
6 These unfortunate Jews were those who witnessed the murder in the gas chambers and were responsible
for removing the dead bodies from the chambers to the crematoria for burning.

11
has been included, he is effectively proclaiming his access to the fullness of the Truth as
opposed to their narrowly pagan glimpses o f it: only he can map out the entire abyss of
Hell and chart the heights of Purgatory and Paradise beyond it. Levi is not the only
witness who can testify to the horrors of the camps, the full experience of which can only
be pieced together gradually from the different viewpoints of those survivors who are
willing to record their fragmentary memories and far-from-partial reflections.
While Levi’s ironic redeployment of Dantean binaries helps to define his dual role
as survivor/author against the universalizing precedent of the pilgrim/poet of the
Commedia, allusions to the Sacred Poem in Holocaust narratives are not always as
explicit as Levi’s or as useful in providing guidance to understanding (let alone
answering) the overwhelming questions facing the survivors. Levi sees a clear
relationship between himself, his narrative, and the Commedia, but that very clarity
underscores the problematic of projecting the Commedia onto a Holocaust narrative.
Immediately problematic is the cultural gulf separating the Poet’s medieval universe from
the ever-provisional world of modernity. Dante-poet is a Christian medieval poet looking
to help save Christian souls from eternal damnation, not only in his own time period but
also for future Christian souls. His experience is deeply personalized because he is
chosen for a specific reason and given a specific purpose. Levi is a Jewish Holocaust
survivor looking to tell his story because of a need to write7 in order to warn the world
that another Holocaust is possible. Also, Dante deals with eternity while Levi deals with
a specific twentieth-century event. Dante is concerned with Christian souls but Levi is
concerned with all who can heed his warning. Both writers oscillate between authorial

7 Tony Judt explains that Se Questo E Un Uomo has “an urgent, imperative present tense, telling the reader
what must be known” (50).
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positions within and beyond their narratives, but for different political and psychological
reasons. Even though Dante and Levi use their texts as warnings, are the goals similar
enough to warrant a comparison between their projects? Is Dante ultimately more of an
impediment than an impetus to the collective project of telling the truth about the
Holocaust in narrative form?

The appeal o f the Commedia to narrators of the Holocaust can be linked to Dante’s
rhetorical battle with the inability to express the events he describes. Confronted almost
constantly with phenomena he struggles to describe to the reader, Dante still manages to
provide an account o f them through the allegorical use of typological parallels and
metaphorical images. At the beginning of Inferno the poet-pilgrim is unsure of himself
and his ability to embark on the pilgrimage, but by the end of Paradiso he has expanded
his creative powers, strengthened his will, and clarified his vision so that he can embark
on the daunting project of writing the Commedia. He is confident that he can describe the
incredible things he sees on his journey. Levi similarly begins from a position of
incredulity (Se Questo 35). Though he is recording his own experiences and observations
of the Holocaust, he is still unable to comprehend them fully and worries that he will be
unable to convince his readers that he is telling the truth. Is Dante-poet’s ability in the
Commedia to empower his own voice by transcending the ineffability topos a rhetorical
strategy open to anyone trying to express the inexpressible horrors of the Holocaust?
Dantean allegory expands and clarifies metaphoric images even as it transfers
them into narrative: a creative process that would surely appeal to authors struggling to
bring clarity and coherent meaning to the muddle of events loosely gathered together as
“the Holocaust” (an already allegorical label). Levi, Wajda and Weiss all engage
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typologically with the Commedia and this engagement enhances the meaning of their
experiences and their works as they present them to the reader or viewer. For witnesses
to the incomprehensibility and seemingly unprecedented horror of the Holocaust, the
discovery in Dante of comparably bizarre or horrifying experiences would no doubt offer
reassurance that the project of recording experiences de profundis was at least possible.
If the extraordinary events in the Commedia can be understood allegorically then maybe
the perplexities of the Holocaust might be rendered intelligible through allusive narration.
In this study I will analyze how three allegorists of the Holocaust— Primo Levi, Andrzej
Wajda, and Peter Weiss—turned to the Commedia as a model for rendering the
inexpressible in persuasive words and images and the incomprehensible in powerfully
clear structures of meaning.

~

The engagement between the Commedia and Holocaust narratives does not just
move from the Commedia to the other narrative. The Holocaust narratives also, in their
typological engagements with the Commedia, inform the reader’s modem understanding
of the medieval poem. At the start o f the third cantica Dante explains that he desires his
poem to be read by future generations and to be all encompassing, hoping that “poca
favilla gran fiamma seconda” [a great flame follows a little spark] {Par. 1.34). He intends
the Commedia to be the “poca favilla” which will ignite a “gran fiamma” of
understanding and desire to learn more about the afterlife through which he travels. The
narratives that allude to the Commedia then reshape how the poem is reread, as if each
new text presented to the Commedia provides new material for its expansive flame.
These works make use of Dante in many ways and this in turn helps the reader return to
the Commedia with an expanded understanding of the poem. How do the Holocaust
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narratives make use o f different sections o f the Commedia and how do these uses help to
expand Dante’s allegories o f human nature, political order, and retributive justice?

HI

.

,

In the following chapters, I will seek answers to these questions by examining three
Holocaust narratives that address Dantean allegory from three very different authorial
positions.1 Levi’s method o f identifying and mirroring ironic binaries from the Inferno has
already been introduced. As a Holocaust memoirist, he has a close identification not only
with the pilgrim but also with the poet because both discuss events they have experienced
first-hand. His projection of the Inferno onto Auschwitz springs fronrhis deep emotional
connection with Dante as the supreme poet o f exile and marginalization.
Andrzej Wajda’s film Kanat belongs to the genres of War and Suspense. Very
different from Levi, Wajda, as a Christian Pole, had no direct experiences with the Lager
but did assist the large resistance movement in Poland before being exiled for his
involvement. Wajda draws a fairly obvious topographic analogy between the Dantean
underworld and the sewers leading down and away from Warsaw, but beyond that, as if
gazing at the obscure outline of Purgatory in the distance, he works out a strong political
connection between the escaping prisoners and the souls in the second cantica. The
political concepts that dominate Dante’s writing, as Joan M. Ferrante points out,
are the role of the empire and of the church in secular government,
particularly in Italy, the relations between independent city-states or separate
kingdoms and the empire, the destructive roles played by France and
Florence, the divisive factionalism of political parties, Black and White
Guelphs, Guelphs and Ghibellines, the corruption of the papacy and the papal
curia, and the ideal of Rome. (181)
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As a political poet Dante was preoccupied with the separation of Church and Empire, the
factionalizing discord of the Italian city-states, and the urgent need to define an ideally
just system of government. He introduces these concerns into the Commedia in order for
medieval Italy to confront its political and moral crises and to help solve them before they
caused complete destruction. Wajda similarly uses his allegorical film-narratives to
comment on the political situation in Poland. He sees Poland as both a political and
spiritual state, just as Dante saw Italy in its ideal state as a concord of imperial and
ecclesiastical powers. Janina Falkowska notes that “Wajda sees Polish identity as linked
to the spiritual perception of the nation’s essence and to its heroic past. He introduces the
issues of responsibility, o f the fight for freedom and honor, each important for the
ultimate defining of national identity” (52). To become an ideal nation Poland must unite
its spiritual and political energies, which is precisely what Dante urged Italy to do in his
meditations on the proper relation between Pope and Emperor.
: When Wajda was asked to speak about social progress and what Poland means to
him, he made clear his belief that social progress can only come from an independent
nation and that is why through his films he “endeavourfs] to widen the scope of liberty, so
that people may express their real hopes and desires” (Karpinski 13). His desires for
Poland stem from a very strong identification with his nation and with his hope for
Poland on the world stage. When asked what Poland meant to him, he responded:
Everything. My past and my future. It is the landscape that I see from my
window, it is the nation’s history and its art, past and future. I want to take
part in something vital. I have dreamt of this all my life; it is what I have
always wanted. I have always believed that Poland occupied an important
place on the European map and that Poland counts. Therefore, as a Pole, I am
able to take part in significant and crucial events. (Karpinski 13)
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Wajda hopes Poland will be liberated from any form of political control and be allowed to
become an independent nation. He believes this political and national independence is
only achievable if every individual Pole who cares for Poland wishes the same. He wants
everyone to know that Poland occupies “an important place on the European map and that
Poland counts.” Dante expressed similar beliefs about Italy in Purgatorio, the Holy
Mountain being the only one of his three realms positioned in the surface of the earth
within the temporal range of human history. Through hope and hard work the souls of
Purgatory purge their sins in order to reunite in the Heavenly Kingdom where harmony is
found. Wajda’s hopes for Poland as an independent and harmonious nation neatly
dovetail with Dante’s purgatorial recovery of hope for his “serva Italia” [Italy enslaved]
(Purg. 6.76).
Peter Weiss also draws inspiration from Dante’s political activism. Just as Dante
was “a European adapting to permanent exile from Florence under the threat of execution
[Weiss was] exiled to Sweden [under] the threat of burning at the concentration camps”
(Pike 66). Both Weiss and Dante must confront the political systems that have forced
them to flee their homes in order to escape death. Dante’s ability to mediate between
exclusion and inclusion helps him search for these answers. Dante’s pilgrimage through
the afterlife culminates in political illumination about the ideal state, and as a
consequence he is able to understand his exile from a position not of a dispirited exile but
of a committed activist. Rather than the afterlife, Weiss is dealing with an aftermath—
specifically the unfolding of his career amid the tumult of post-War Germany. In his
documentary drama Die Ermittlung, he backgrounds the crisis of his own exile in order to
concentrate on the quest for justice undertaken by the survivors of Auschwitz. His
dramatic “investigation” o f their emotional as well as judicial trials implicitly records his
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own struggle to find answers to the conundrums of the Third Reich. Reflecting on the
broad cultural significance of der Auschwitz-Prozess, Rebecca Wittmann asks the
following questions:
But what exactly is it that came to pass here? The civilized world’s settling
of accounts with Hitler’s murder system? A moral and political-lesson,
meant for those who lived during the era o f Auschwitz who went far in the art
of repression, and a signal of deterrence for the generation that followed? A
historical investigation in which, in a courtroom, stroke by stroke, a narrowly
circumscribed chapter of German history was recorded by living human
beings? The wish itself [that the trial could serve these functions] suggests
that the Auschwitz Trial could have been all this. (250-1)
The trials fail to be what the spectators in the courtroom hope it will be. Wittmann notes
that “the Auschwitz Trial could have been all this,” which suggests that in practice, it
failed to be these things. It was therefore not successful as “a moral and political-lesson”
or “a historical investigation in which. . . a narrowly circumscribed chapter of German
history was recorded by living human beings.” Die Ermittlung reached a larger audience
than the spectators o f the trials did, and Weiss could therefore use his play to spread these
messages in the aftermath of the failure of the German justice system. Dante views the
political system of Italy as failing and therefore uses his poem not only to proclaim the
failure but also to help the people of Italy make it a stronger nation. Only in Paradise can
Dante attain the clarity required to understand his earthly exile in its universal context
instead relying on the divine justice found there to condemn those deserving of it on
Earth. Dante must rely on God’s grace and providential view of history in order to
understand the injustice behind his exile. While the answers to the broad questions raised
by the trials remain provisional, Weiss draws inspiration from Paradiso to sustain his
investigative project of discovering a larger justice system than the German courts for
determining the guilt of the perpetrators of the Holocaust.
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Like Dante-poet, Weiss embarks on his investigation of the justice system for the
benefit of all humanity now and in the future—not just for his contemporaries in Europe.
One critic notes that Weiss deliberately pierces the fourth wall in the theatre in order to
shift the dramatic focus
from the Auschwitz trial to the role of the audience during the trial. [The
piercing of the fourth wall] signaled not only that ordinary Germans had sat
idly by during the Holocaust but also that they continued to be uninvolved
witnesses to the debate over Holocaust responsibility. (Windham 211)
His motivation for writing Die Ermittlung is to involve the uninvolved—the disengaged
or simply indifferent majority— in what had hitherto been the intense judiciary concerns
of a tiny minority of defendants and witnesses. Observing that der Auschwitz-Prozess
had little lasting effect on the attitudes of post-War Germans towards the Holocaust,
Weiss hoped his play would help to prevent such horrific events in the future. Wittmann
noted that “most people saw the grisly crimes of the sadistic defendants as if they were
part of a macabre fantasy world— ‘Dante’s Inferno,’ as Martin Walser described it—and
did not make a connection between the perpetrators on trial, the harmless neighbours
living peacefully beside them, and their own role in the Nazi past” (247). The only way
for Weiss to understand his own exile lay in finding out how to make the public aware
that they had also participated in the Nazi past and that a “connection between the
perpetrators on trial, the harmless neighbours living peacefully beside them” needed to be
made in order to correct the past.
Two ordering principles have guided my readings of Levi, Wajda, and Weiss.
First, I have dealt with their works in chronological order according to date of
publication. Second, following the sequence of cantiche in the Commedia, I have devoted
my first chapter to Levi because of his intense engagement with Inferno; my second
\
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chapter to Wajda because of his political investment in Purgatorio; and my third chapter
to Weiss because o f his ethical alignment with Paradiso. I hope that as readers move
through this study they will have a sense of the journey that each of these three modem
allegorists had to take in their struggle to narrate the Holocaust. It is a journey patterned,
at least in part, on the long route back to the “verace via” [tme way] {Inf. 1.12) once
abandoned by Dante-poet in the Dark Wood but recovered by Dante-poet in the
Empyrean.

.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Demolition of a Condemned Man: Pnmo Levi’s Se Questo E un Uomo and Dante’s
,

Inferno

:

During a moment o f reprieve8 in Auschwitz, Primo Levi reports that he recited as
much o f Inferno 26 as he could remember to a young Frenchman named Jean. Jean asks
Levi to teach him some Italian and Levi chooses to instruct him in Dante’s Florentine
dialect. Just as the reader is transported to the late Middle Ages in Hell to imagine the
conversation between Ulysses and Dante, Levi and Jean escape for an instant, distancing
themselves both mentally and historically from the Lager. Only at this moment does Levi
verbalize the typological engagement, word for word, that he feels with Dante. Levi feels
rushed, pressured to provide Jean with complex personal answers to two deceptively
simple questions: “Chi e Dante? Che cosa e la Commedia?” (Se Questo 101) [Who is
Dante? What is the Comedy?] (Woolf 112). For Levi this episode in Auschwitz becomes
the moment of explicit connection between his horrific experiences and Dante’s infernal
journey, though implicit references to Dante’s Inferno occur much earlier in Se Questo E
un Uomo. As Levi watches everyone unloaded at the rail station in Auschwitz he
immediately realizes that in Auschwitz “non e un comando, non e regolamento questo: si
vede bene che e una piccola iniziativa privata del nostro caronte. La cosa suscita in noi
collera e riso e uno strano sollievo” (Se Questo 18) [There is no order, no regulation: it is
obvious that it is a small private initiative of our Charon. The matter stirs us to anger and
laughter and brings relief] (Woolf 21). Charon, the ferryman of Hell, conveys the
8 By a moment o f reprieve, I mean that Jean and Levi were able to stop work in order to get the soup from
the kitchen for lunch. I am not suggesting that at any point during his time in the camps was Levi able to
rest and to make a full escape, even mentally, from the Lager.
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Damned to the far shore of Acheron where they will fall to their appropriate circles, just
as on the ramps the Jews are told where to go without care for their well-being. Levi and
the members of his transport are introduced to their own “caronte” and the bathos
generated by the allusion provokes a salutary mixture of “collera e riso.” In Inferno 3,.
when Dante meets Charon, the emotional responses are not from the pilgrim but from the
demonic pilot and the damned souls awaiting transport in his bark. Virgil must intercede
to calm their passions:
. . . “Caron, non ti crucciare:
vuoisi così colà dove si puote
ciò ché si vuole, e più non dimandare.”
Quinci fuor quete le lanose gote
al nocchier de la livida palude,
c h e ’ntomo a li occhi avea di fiamme rote.
Ma quell’anime, ch’eran lasse e nude,
cangiar colore e dibatterò i denti,
ratto c h e ’nteser le parole crude.
[. .. ‘Charon, do not torment yourself.
It is so willed where will and power are one,
and ask no more.’
That stilled the shaggy jowls
of the pilot of the livid marsh,
about whose eyes burned wheels of flame.
But those souls, naked and desolate,
lost their color. With chattering teeth
they heard his brutal words.] {Inf. 3.94-102)

v

I;

Charon’s anger is stilled and the damned souls waiting to be judged are frightened by
Virgil’s words. By contrast, the “small private initiative” of Charon’s Nazi counterpart
makes the Jews angry—the souls’ teeth chatter but the Jews are stirred to laughter and
feel relief. Levi’s “caronte” has no overarching power structure to which to adhere,
whereas Dante-pilgrim’s Charon does his work because of the divine justice system
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imposed on him (as on all the demons) by God. To each inmate of Auschwitz there
appears to be no structure, only torture and chaos. Levi notes that “non è un comando,
non è regolamento questo.” The chaos prevents Levi from comprehending the location in
which he finds himself, even though he recognizes a similarity between his forced entry
into the Lager and the somewhat disorderly conveyance of the newly damned towards
their infernal abodes.
Levi grasps at the allusion to the initiation in Inferno 3 as if to demand answers for
why the Jews are being rounded up and condemned to Auschwitz. Having survived the
initiation, Levi arrives in a barrack and asks a question about his new abode:
Ho aperto la finestra, ho staccato il ghiacciolo, ma subito si è fatto avanti uno
grande e grosso che si aggirava là fuori, e me lo ha strappato brutalmente. Warum? - gli ho chiesto nel mio povero tedesco. - Hier ist kein Warum, (qui non c’è perché), mi ha risposto, ricacciandomi dentro con uno spintone.
(Se Questo 25)
[I opened the window and broke off the icicle but at once a large, heavy guard
prowling outside brutally snatched it away from me. ‘ Warum?’ I asked him in
my poor German. ‘Hier ist kein warum’ (there is no why here), he replied,
pushing me inside with a shove.] (Woolf 29)
Though his question is deceptively simple, Levi is searching for complex answers to the
riddle of his situation. The German guard’s response provides more suffering and no
clarity. Levi, still searching to comprehend his situation, recalls another scene from
Dante: “Qui non ha loco il Santo Volto! / qui si nuota altrimenti che nel Serchio!” [This is
no place for the Holy Visage! / Here you swim a different stroke than in the Serchio!]
(Inf. 21.48-9; quoted in Se Questo 25). A devil screams at a soul who attempts to escape
re-submersion in the mire of Malebolge. No sooner does this demonic moment from the
Eighth Circle cross Levi’s mind than he casts his thoughts back to the First: “ora dopo
ora, questa prima lunghissima giornata di antinfemo volge al termine” (Se Questo 25)
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[hour after hour, this first long day o f limbo draws to its end] (Woolf 29). Thus does his
allusive memory move freely across Dante’s underworld, drawing Upper and Lower Hell
together in an ominous simultaneity. In contrast to the Inferno, with its concentric design
rigorously explicable at every turn by the logic of scholastic rationalism, the place where
“ist kein Warum” defies rational explanation. In a “why-less” space the explanatory
structure of the Commedia collapses.
Levi’s analysis o f logical comprehension continues during his documentation o f
how the Jews respond to the random choices the Nazis make for them throughout their
day. Including himself in this analysis o f the structure of Auschwitz, Levi suggests that
Se fossimo ragionevoli, dovremmo rassegnarci a questa evidenza, che il
nostro destino è perfettamente inconoscibile, che ogni congettura è arbitraria
ed esattamente priva di fondamento reale. Ma ragionevoli gli uomini sono
assai raramente, quando è in gioco il loro proprio destino . . . Le due classi,
dei pessimisti e degli ottimisti, non sono peraltro cosi ben distinte: non già
perché gli agnostici siano molti, ma perché i più, senza memoria né coerenza,
oscillano fra le due posizioni-limite, a seconda dell’interlocutore e del
momento. (Se Questo 31)
[If we were logical, we would resign ourselves to the evidence that our fate is
beyond knowledge, that every conjecture is arbitrary and demonstrably
devoid of foundation. But men are rarely logical when their own fate is at
stake . . . The two classes of pessimists and optimists are not so clearly
defined, however, not because there are many agnostics, but because the
majority, without memory or coherence, drift between the two extremes,
according to the moment and the mood of the person they happen to meet.]
(Woolf 36)
Levi sees a correspondence between the Noble Pagans in Limbo and the Jews who
“oscillano fra le due posizioni-limite,” where there are neither sinners nor saints, only
souls who were bom before Christ’s birth or died in infancy without baptism. He also
seems to believe, however, that because there are no rules, he cannot control his fate,
something he must contend with as he searches for a way to understand the camp. Since
Levi is concerned with his own fate, his own suggestion is that he cannot be logical. Here
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is perhaps a reason why he plays fast and loose with the strict chronology of events in
Dante’s underworld journey. Writing retrospectively from a position outside the Lager,
Levi recognizes his inability to separate himself from the disorder of the “dentro” where
“noi” still exist in a state of perpetual suspense .
While initially accepting that he must not be logical, he is unable to maintain that
acceptance for long and instead seeks to acknowledge the simple lack of a system. In the
latrines, Levi comes across a prisoner, Steinlauf, who explains to him that he must wash,
even though any attempt at cleanliness in the Lager is futile. While Levi appreciates
Steinlauf s attempt to regain an orderly decent life, he cannot adopt the same strategy for
himself, and instead asks “sarà proprio necessario elaborare un sistema e praticarlo? 0
non sarà più salutare prendere coscienza di non avere sistema?” (Se Questo 36) [Is it
really necessary to elaborate a system and put it into practice? Or would it not be better to
acknowledge one’s lack of a system?] (Woolf 41). Levi seeks at least to identify the
problem (even if a solution to it is impossible to find) simply in order to maintain his
rational grasp on reality. While Steinlauf creates his own system, it is merely personal,
idiosyncratic. Levi, who constantly refers to himself in the first person plural, is looking
for a more universal system of rationally coherent causes and effects.
Lynn M. Gunzberg examines Levi’s singularly resolute reliance on a logic not
apparent in the camps. Levi must mediate between his personal experience (and others’
personal experiences) and an ability to understand all that occurred in the camps. As
Gunzberg notes, “the geometry of the Inferno and Dante’s technique of casting into relief
some sinners by endowing them with physical and verbal portraits afforded Levi a
structural framework with which to describe the Lager and fix a small number o f inmates
as the universal types—positive and negative—he wished to immortalize” (27). Levi’s
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use of Steinlauf then becomes an examination of the type of inmate who deals with the
lack o f logic by creating his own structure, even though that structure does not help Levi
himself deal with the lack of rationality in the camps. Gunzberg also commends his use
of Dante to interpret the Holocaust by comparing it with his application of the scientific
method to
delve into the forces of nature and human compulsions in order to discover
the laws which govern them, laws which remain hidden to the untrained eye
; . . Levi shared a bond with Dante for whom theology was the key to
unlocking] the mysteries of the universe, to discover order in the world and
; ■ thereby free himself from the confusion and fear residing in the “dark wood.”
(26)
While Levi, at the beginning of his testimony, casts an “untrained eye” over the rules of
Auschwitz, he still seeks to apply laws to the camp, to “unlock the mysteries of the
universe,” and to “free himself from the confusion and fear” of the Lager. His allusions
to Dante help the reader to understand the mechanisms of the camp and the impact of its
irrationality on himself and his fellow inmates.
When Levi becomes more experienced in the camp and is no longer the :
“untrained eye,” he is able to detect the operation of an “unjust law” within its routine
disorderliness. Striving to adopt a universal perspective, he notes that
Nella storia e nella vita pare talvolta di discemere una legge feroce, che suona
« a chi ha, sarà dato; a chi non ha, a quello sarà to lto » . Nel Lager, dove
l’uomo è solo e la lotta per la vita si riduce al suo meccanismo primordiale, la
legge iniqua è apertamente in vigore, è riconosciuta da tutti. (Se Questo 80)
[In history and in life one sometimes seems to glimpse a ferocious law which
states: ‘to he that has, will be given; from he that has not, will be taken away’.
In the Lager, where man is alone and where the struggle for life is reduced to
its primordial mechanism, this unjust law is openly in force, is recognized by
all.] (Woolf 88)
Levi mentions not only “life” but also “history,” suggesting that while the mechanism of
the camp aimed to deprive the Jews of both, he can still see them. While Levi must at
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first rely on “Hier ist kein Warum” as an absurd explanation for his condition, as a more
experienced inmate he is able to apply reason to the irrational and develop a provisional
understanding of “la legge iniqua.” To reconcile the mechanisms of the Lager with
humanity, he struggles to maintain à rationality that applies to all the “noi” who are
“dentro.” '
Levi’s mediations on human nature in extremis are not limited to the logic of the
camp. While he struggles to float above a wretched underclass satirically labelled
“mussulmano” [musselman], whose ranks include “i deboli, gli inetti, i votati alla
selezione” (Se Questo 80) [the weak, the inept, those doomed to selection] (Woolf 88), he
does not ignore how the Lager creates these inferiors. Though the label appears late in
the testimony, he has seen representatives of this type before, and has-discussed them as
men destroyed in the camp. A “mussulmano”
sarà un uomo vuoto, ridotto a sofferenza e bisogno, dimentico di dignità e
discernimento, poiché accade facilmente, a chi ha perso tutto, di perdere se
stesso; tale quindi, che si potrà a cuor leggero decidere della sua vita o morte
al di fuori di ogni senso di affinità umana; nel caso più fortunato, in base ad
un puro giudizio di utilità. (Se Questo 23)
[will be a hollow man, reduced to suffering and needs, forgetful of dignity
and restraint, for he who loses all often easily loses himself. He will be a man
whose life or death can be lightly decided with no sense of human affinity, in
the most fortunate of cases, on the basis of a pure judgement of utility.]
(Woolf 27) ,
Levi here identifies with someone other than this “uomo vuoto,” which suggests that he
has not lost himself. Previously Levi noted that if such figures were logical men they
would realize that they had no choice over their own life and death, but here he
contradicts that statement when he notes that this hollow man’s life or death can be
C\

lightly decided “al di fuori di ogni senso di affinità umana.” In either case there seems to
be no choice given to the inmate, but Levi sees himself as having a choice. He can either
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resign himself to becoming a hollow man or resist it by retaining his sense of human
dignity.
Gunzberg defines how Levi must view Dante’s Inferno. She describes his
understanding of the Inferno as “a place in which the naked shadow of a man, reduced
from subject to object, is completely at the mercy of forces greater than himself, powers
which reside in everyone and everything other than he— even other prisoners. To cling to
past realities was defeating and yet to give them up was to give in” (13). Instead of
clinging to a past, reality, Levi chooses instead to cling to a fictional account from his past
life as an intellectual. In this way he is able not to “give in” but also not to be defeated by
his own memories. His allusions to Dante seem to highlight not just the similarities but
also the differences between them as authors, differences overlooked-by Gunzberg. As a
vast prison, the Inferno reveals the operations of a Divine Power greater than the
collective will of Fallen Humanity; but still, as the pilgrim discovers, the souls
condemned to its depths are not entirely stripped of power. Levi’s Hell, by contrast,
contains only the disempowered. In order to make the reader understand the destruction
of humanity, Levi intensifies an image of Fallen Man already horrific in its original
Dantean context. While Gunzberg notes that to return to a past reality “was defeating,”
this “defeat” allows Levi to confront the Nazis’ attack on humanity and to withstand the
attack on the dignity o f his own personhood.
Like the hierarchical design of the Inferno, the power-structure of the Lager hides
its disorder beneath the illusion of a tyrannical distribution of labour. As Gunzberg points
out:

'

. . . if one could ascend this pyramid one would pass through thugs in
positions of middling responsibility, to the jackbooted brutality of the SS to
reach the rarefied circles of madness in the high command. Levi calls this the
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geometrical insanity o f the Lager, that is the creation of an elaborate and
efficient system by which the elements of human life— even intangibles such
as the limit o f physical and psychological endurance:—are measured by their
contribution to the goal of destruction. (15)
Levi is unable to ascend this pyramid. Recognizing that the goal of destruction requires
human sacrifice, he is nevertheless unable to be that person who is willing to sacrifice
others for his own personal gain.
Still meditating on the will to destroy humanity at the heart of the Lager, Levi
reports on the return of the inmates to the camp at night after a day’s work:
Quando questa musica suona, noi sappiamo che i compagni, fuori nella
nebbia, partono in marcia come automi; le loro anime sono morte e la musica
li sospinge, come il vento le foglie secche, e si sostituische alla loro volontà.
Non c’è più volontà: ogni pulsazione diventa un passo, una contrazione
riflessa dei muscoli sfatti. I tedeschi sono riusciti a questo. Sono diecimila, e
sono una sola grigia macchina; sono esattamente determinati; non pensano e
non vogliono, camminano. (Se Questo 45)
[When this music plays we know that our comrades, out in the fog, are
marching like automatons; their souls are dead and the music drives them,
like the wind drives dead leaves, and takes the place of their wills. There is
no longer any will: every beat of the drum becomes a step, a reflected
contraction of exhausted muscles. The Germans have succeeded in this.
They are ten thousand and they are a single grey machine; they are exactly
determined; they do not think and they do not desire, they walk.] (Woolf 51)
The will o f these “automi” has been destroyed; they “non pensano e non vogliono,
j
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camminano.” Their humanity has been stripped to the core and they only follow the
insanity of the Lager. The Nazis have succeeded in making the “diecimila” a “sola grigia
macchina.” While Levi is clearly here blaming the Nazis for the reduction of humanity to
a machine, the consequent destruction of humanity makes him turn again to Dante. This
passage includes an allusion to Inferno 13 where Dante meets the suicides and is asked by
one of them to pick up the leaves of his bush which have been scattered by a passing soul
(Inf. 13.139-51). Levi uses this echo to suggest a typological parallel between the
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vegetative state of the automatons in the camps and the immobility o f the human
“vegetation” in the Wood of the Suicides. The unnamed soul’s leaves are tossed to the
ground just as Levi describes the “automi” as having souls blown “come il vento le foglie
secche.” Levi implicitly distinguishes himself from such souls at a tropological as well as
psychological level, just as Dante did in confronting the metamorphic consequences of
the sinful despair of the suicides. He does not want to be like the “diecimila” who return
to the Lager every evening, the “diecimila” who have already given up.
Although Levi singles himself out as different from the mass of inmates in the
Lager, he readily acknowledges the importance of having wise guides to help him
survive. Initially guides are dismissed as useless. When Levi and the others from his
transport are waiting for instructions, a young French prisoner comes in to tell them what
to do next. They ask many questions of this boy, but as Levi notes,
; non parla volentieri: nessuno qui parla volentieri. Siamo nuovi, non abbiamo
niente e non sappiamo niente; a che scopo perdere tempo con noi? (Se Questo
... 25)
'
.
[he does not speak willingly; no one here speaks willingly. We are new, we
have nothing and we know nothing; why waste time on us?] (Woolf 29)
A guide is put into the room with them, but he does not want to waste time with the new
inmates. The inmates finally get a few answers, but when they ask him a pointed
question about this destination, he responds with a sneer: “Vous n ’etes pas a la maison”
(Se Questo 25).9 There is only contempt for Levi’s question, no good will directed at him
at all. The Dantean counterpart of this figure is Pier delle Vigne. Dante is instructed by
Virgil to snap a branch from a thorn tree in order that the soul trapped inside it might give

9 [“You are not at home.”] The translation o f these words is not provided in Survival in Auschwitz: A Nazi
Assault on Humanity. Levi recreates the unwillingness to talk by leaving the translation out o f his text, just
as W oolf also leaves out the translation.
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voice to his agony. At first the soul angrily questions Dante’s motives for breaking the
branch {Inf. 13.28-36). Even after a channel is opened up for his voice, Pier has difficulty
forming words and transmitting them to his listener {Inf. 13.40-4). Virgil informs Pier
that he must speak, forcing him to tell Dante of his decision to commit suicide. The
young boy sent in to speak to the Jews as a guide does not speak willingly or kindly, just
as Pier delle Vigne must be forced by Virgil to speak to Dante. No one in the Lager
speaks willingly, and when they do speak the words are not meant to guide the Jews.
Prompted by Virgil, Pier explains that Dante will not believe his explanation. Pier
must therefore speak for himself, and if he does speak, Dante will be able to increase his
fame in the world {Inf. 13.46-54). By alluding to this incident, Levi not only highlights
the harsh nature of the camp but also confronts the problem of disbelief. He explains that
because they are new and have nothing and know nothing they are not worth anything to
the French boy. These initiates cannot guarantee that they will be able to believe
anything the French boy might tell them. The snarled remark “Vous n ’ètes pas à la
maison” reminds them that they will find nothing familiar in the Lager, only a
strangeness, a newness, a bareness. The talking thorn trees are similarly out of the
1

ordinary, so unfamiliar in fact that Virgil anticipates Dante’s incredulity in addressing the
suicides. While Virgil promises fame when Dante returns to the world, such a reward is
inconsequential from the viewpoint of the Christian poet. Dante-poet establishes fame for
Pier but this does not change the suicide’s afterlife. Levi describes his questions as “con
un’ingenuità” {Se Questo 25) [with an ingenuity] (Woolf 29) he later thinks is incredible.
The echo bleakly suggests that despite the promise of fame, nothing in the situation can
be changed, for either Pier or Levi. They are both condemned to their respective prisons.
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Recalling the aphasic despair of the suicides, Levi notes that no one in the Lager
speaks willingly. While Pier physically manifests this condition in his imprisoning bark,
the outward sign o f his suicidal introversion, Levi resists it with all his intellectual force
by identifying the will to speak with the will to live in the camp. The young boy can gain
nothing from Levi and so refuses to answer his questions. Pier assumes the role of
spokesman in the Wood o f the Suicides but does so unwillingly and only because he is
promised fame. Levi, by contrast, is able to define himself as human through the need to
understand and the will to return and tell of his experiences just as Dante returns to tell of
Pier’s suicide. This unwillingness, however, still leaves Levi without a guide.
His true guide to survival, the provider of mental stability as well as physical
nourishment, is a fellow inmate named Lorenzo. He proves to be the very opposite of a
hollow man:
. . . la sua umanità era pura e incontaminata, egli era al di fuori di questo
mondo di negazione. Grazie a Lorenzo mi è accaduto di non dimenticare di
essere io stesso un uomo. (Se Questo 109)
[ . . . his humanity was pure and uncontaminated, he was outside this world of
negation. Thanks to Lorenzo, I managed not to forget that I myself was a
man.] (W oolf 122)
In order to function as Levi’s Virgil, Lorenzo must be able to maintain his “umanità”
under the most appalling pressures of negation and dehumanization. Where the
Frenchman had no willingness to maintain human connections by answering Levi,
Lorenzo takes the time to do so and reminds Levi of what humanity is.
■Levi’s philosophical concern with these human connections is highlighted by the
conditional clause he chose as the title for his memoir: Se Questo È un Uomo. When the
literal translation “If This is a Man” was not considered sellable in the North American
market, Levi made sure that his concern with humanity was emphasized in the
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periphrastic alternative title Survival in Auschwitz: A Nazi Assault on Humanity (Judt 46).
Here the reader returns to Steinlauf s personal system of survival. While Levi notes that
“dopo mezz’ora ai sacchi di carbone ogni differenza. . . sarà scomparsa” (Se Questo 35)
[after half an hour with the coal sacks every difference . . . will have disappeared] (Woolf
40) Steinlauf continues to wash. In recalling Steinlauf s actions Levi first describes the
manner o f the ex-soldier’s speech as a sign o f his humanity and then sums up the
unforgettable lesson behind it that could not be lost in translation:
Ho scordato ormai, e me ne duole, le sue parole diritte e chiare, le parole del
già sergente Steinlauf dell’esercito austro-ungarico, croce di ferro della guerra
’ 14-18. Me ne duole, perché dovrò tradurre il suo italiano incerto e il suo
discorso piano di buon soldato nel mio linguaggio di uomo incredulo. Ma
questo ne era il senso, non dimenticato allora né poi: che appunto perché il
Lager è una gran macchina per ridurci a bestie, noi bestie non dobbiamo
diventare. (Se Questo 35)
~
[It grieves me now that I have forgotten his plain, outspoken words, the words
of ex-sergeant Steinlauf of the Austro-Hungarian army, Iron Cross of the ’ 14’ 18 war. It grieves me because it means that I have to translate his uncertain
Italian and his quiet manner of speaking of a good soldier into my language
of an incredulous man. But this was the sense, not forgotten either then or
later: that precisely because the Lager was a great machine to reduce us to
beasts, we must not become beasts.] (Woolf 41)
Though memory fails him when it comes to the exact wording of Steinlauf s lesson, he
cannot forget the sergeant’s exemplary resistance to dehumanization. By remembering
Steinlauf s humanity, Levi is able to differentiate his approach in the camps from
Steinlauf s, but in so doing remembers himself as a person. His fervent recollection of
the tropological impact o f the sergeant’s lesson is directly followed by a discussion of
how the Lager was designed to make men beasts. Steinlauf washes to maintain his
humanity, to resist the design of the Lager, and this is what Levi remembers, even if he
does not remember the words of the man. As Gillian Banner points out memory is tied
into the ability to remain human. She notes that “there is also the recognition that, for
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survival to be possible, memories of life ‘before’ and ‘outside’ Auschwitz were vital,
recollection was life-giving” (88). After the camp Levi is unable to remember the
Steinlauf o f ‘before’ and ‘outside’ Auschwitz, the “già sergente Steinlauf dell’esercito
austro-ungarico,” but he does remember what he has forgotten about him and so perhaps
this also sustains the ideal of humanity exemplified by the sergeant.
In his fundamentally humanistic classification of the inmates, Levi differentiates
between beasts and human beings, noting that the prevailing destiny in the camps was to
become a beast. As he describes it:

'■ ‘

Bisogna risalire la corrente; dare battaglia ogni giorno e ogni ora alla fatica,
alla fame, al freddo, e alla inerzia che ne deriva; resistere ai nemici e non aver
pietà per i rivali; aguzzare l’ingegno, indurare la pazienza, tendere la volontà. O anche, strozzare ogni dignità e spegnere ogni lume di coscienza, scendere
in campo da bruti contro gli altri bruti, lasciarsi guidare dalle insospettate
forze sotterranee che sorreggono le stirpi e gli individui nei tempi crudeli. (Se
Questo 83)
[One has to fight against the current; to battle every day and every hour
against exhaustion, hunger, cold and the resulting inertia; to resist enemies
and have no pity for rivals; to sharpen one’s wits, build up one’s patience,
strengthen one’s will-power. Or else, to throttle all dignity and kill all
; conscience, to climb down into the arena as a beast against other beasts, to let
oneself be guided by those unsuspected subterranean forces which sustain
families and individuals in cruel times.] (Woolf 92)
v
A battle line is drawn here between mental acuity and bestial activity. Ironically, both of
these push against the current. How.is Levi able to reconcile this self-survival with
fighting? As an inmate one must either fight with every ounce of one’s humanity or be
reduced to fighting like a beast. Either way the human soul is drained. The survivor must
have a will o f steel orno will at all.
In Lower Hell Dante meets many condemned souls who likewise seem to have
climbed down “in campo da bruti contro gli altri bruti.” Malebolge is especially teeming
with brutish shades, from the hybrid mouth o f Geryon to the frog-like Barrators in the

34
pitch to the reptilian Thieves. In the Tenth Bolgia the disfigured Counterfeiters have lost
their human uprightness because their sinful lives devalued the image of God in Man:
Qual sovra T ventre e qual sovra le spalle
Tun de l’altro giacea, e qual carpone
si trasmutava per lo tristo calle.
[Some lay upon the bellies or the backs
o f others, still others dragged themselves
'
on hands and knees along that gloomy path.] (Inf. 29.67-9)
Here is the Dantean version of the fight against exhaustion, the going against the current
where “non aver pietà per i rivali.” By strategically alluding to the bestial
metamorphoses in Inferno, Levi implicitly removes himself from the ranks of those who
lower themselves to fight like beasts. He identifies himself as one who uses his mental ;
acuity to fight against the current of the camp. While Dante succeeds in escaping from
the infernal prison, Levi is not sure he will.
Banner continues her psychological analysis of Levi’s memoir by looking at the
exhaustion that occurs when trying to maintain one’s humanity through memory. The
choice to remember is as painful as the choice to remain human: “survival, psychological
as well as physical, depends on a ready perception of the necessity of recognizing when to
remember, when to forget. Memory is represented as acutely painful; to remember
homes whilst in the process of being taken from them bestows little benefit” (95). The ,
memory o f what one once was is important for survival, but to remember everything that
is attached to oneself may be dangerous. This is also why Levi explains to the reader that
the recurring dream about his sister must not be relived. The pain accompanying it is
dolore allo stato puro, non temperato dal senso della realtà e dalla intrusione
di circostanze estranee, simile a quelli per cui i bambini piangono; ed è
meglio per me risalire ancora una volta in superficie, ma questa volta apro
deliberatamente gli occhi, per avere di fronte a me stesso una garanzia di
essere effettivamente sveglio. {Se Questo 53-4)
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[pain in its pure state, not tempered by a sense of reality and by the intrusion
of extraneous circumstances, a pain like that which makes children cry; and it
is better for me to swim once again up to the surface, but this time I
deliberately open my eyes to have a guarantee in front of me of being
effectively awake.] (Woolf 60)
In such a dream, memories are brought forward unconsciously and the nostalgia behind
them plunges the dreamer into melancholia, a pain so deep that he feels that he is
drowning. While memory is important in protecting his human identity and strengthening
his will to survive the camps, Levi clearly recognizes the need for selective memory.
Even though Levi needs selective memory in the Lager, facing survival after the
camps made selective memory unacceptable. Levi struggles with his memory, with the
point-by-point recording o f his experiences, as he struggles to document the full
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experience of the Lager. He interrupts his narrative to say that “questo vero oggi in cui io
sto seduto a un tavolo e scrivo, io stesso non sono convinto che queste cose sono
realmente accadute” (Se Questo 93) [at this very moment as I sit writing at a table, I
myself am not convinced that these things really happened] (Woolf 103). Even Levi
himself cannot believe that what happened in the camps is real even as he recalls the
events he experienced. Dante also faces this fear although he admits it at the beginning of
his narrative, noting that it is hard to tell what he saw and the attempt at doing so renews
his fear of being at the beginning of his journey {Inf. 1.4-6). Levi does not mention the
fear of writing his testimony until much later in the text and by that point he is so far into
the narrative that the reader believes his story and hopefully has confidence in his writing.
Dante begins his journey with that fear. The phobic intensity of their recollections
indicates how deeply both authors are concerned with the reception of their memories,
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hoping that they will be able to maintain credibility to the very end of their incredible
stories.
The problem of credibility is also connected to a problem of language. The
confusion of language at the camps is illustrated in Levi’s egregiously allegorical account
of how the inmates built the Carbide Tower. He lists the different names for bricks and
discusses how the bricks were cemented by hate. He then explains that the tower was
built with
Todio e la discordia, come la Torre di Babele, e cosi noi la chiamiamo:
Babelturm, Bobelturm; e odiamo in essa il sogno demente di grandezza dei
nostri padroni, il loro disprezzo di Dio e degli uomini, di noi uomini. (Se .
Questo 65)
[hate and discord, like the Tower of Babel, and it is this that we will call it: Babelturm, Bobelturm; and in it we hate the insane dreaitt of grandeur of our
masters, their contempt for God and men, for us men.] (Woolf 73)
The only thing Levi can make sense of is the hatred and discord of the men building the
tower, not the languages or the rationality of their “padroni.” Levi also recognizes a
hatred of God and a delusion of grandeur in these masters. Upon arrival at the gates to
the City o f Dis, Dante and Virgil are confronted with a crowd of angels who are angry at
seeing a living man in their midst. These are the rebellious angels who fought with Satan
against God. They angrily shout at Dante and Virgil that he should not be on the journey
and should not pass through the Gate (Inf. 8.82-5). Dante does not hate these angels and
instead worries that they will prevent him from his path. Levi however uses the echo to
show the hatred that he and his fellow men also feel for those who hate God and hate
men. While Dante feels fear and bewilderment—rather than hatred— at the sight of the
Rebel Angels who were proud enough to believe they could defeat God, Levi frames his
allegory o f Babel with strong expressions of moral outrage at his “padroni.”
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Before meeting Nimrod, the king who constructed the Tower of Babel, Dante asks
Virgil: “Maestro, di, che terra e questa?” [Master, tell me, what city is this?] {Inf. 31.21).
Dante has seen what he believes to be towers in the distance and wants to know what city
could be at the bottom o f Hell. Virgil explains that what Dante believes to be towers are
actually giants. When they reach the giant Nimrod they cannot communicate with him
because he speaks a tongue only, he can understand: an ego-imprisoning idiolect. Virgil
tells Dante that they should not waste their speech on him because he cannot understand
them and they cannot understand him {Inf. 31.76-81). Nimrod cannot be a man because
he cannot communicate with other men. Levi recollects the Dantean identification of
human nature with the power of speech in his meditation on the limits of language to
express the horror of dehumanization at the camps:

, :

,

Allora per la prima volta ci siamo accorti che la nostra lingua manca di parole
per esprimere questa offesa, la demolizione di un uomo. In un attimo, con
intuizione quasi profetica, la realtà ersi è rivelata:, siamo arrivati al fondo.
Più giù di cosi non si può andare: condizione umana più misera non c’è, e non
è pensabile. Nulla più è nostro: ci hanno folto gli abiti, le scarpe, anche i
capelli; se parleremo, non ci ascolteranno, e se ci ascoltassero, non ci
capirebbero. Oi toglieranno anche il nome: e se vorremo conservarlo,
dovremo trovare in noi la forza di farlo, di fare si che dietro al nome, qualcosa
ancora di noi, di noi quali eravamo, rimanga. {Se Questo 23) v
[Then for the first time .'we became aware that our language lacks words to
express this offence, the demolition of a man. In a moment, with almost
prophetic intuition, the reality was revealed to us: we had reached the bottom.
It is not possible to sink lower than this; no human condition is more
. miserable than this, nor could it conceivably be so. Nothing belongs to us
anymore; they have taken away our clothes, our shoes, even our hair; if we
speak, they will not listen to us, and if they listen, they will not understand.
They will even take away our name: and if we want to keep it, we will have
to find ourselves the strength to do so, to manage somehow so that behind the
name something of us, of us as we were, still remains.] (Woolf 26)
While the language may not be there, while there may not be words to explain what has
happened to him, Levi must struggle to hold onto his humanity by struggling to express
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the offence of “demolizione.” Levi’s attempt to communicate is successful where
Nimrod’s is not. In writing his testimony, he is also able to give a name to those who
may have lost theirs, just as Dante gives names to those who may have been forgotten and
who cannot communicate for themselves.
In Antenora, the second zone of the Ninth Circle, Dante literally bumps into
Bocca degli Abati. When Bocca will not reveal who he is, Dante threatens to rip hair
from his scalp. When Bocca still will not reveal who he is, Dante does not back off in
fear but instead follows through with his threat. Levi records that the inmates lose their
humanity by losing their clothes, their shoes, even their hair, but when Bocca loses his
hair he does not fight to keep his identity. Instead, he refuses to reveal it. Levi says that '
he has reached the bottom; he has reached the lowest point in the camp because he has
lost everything that familiarly confirms who he is. He does not have the words even to
describe this loss, but maintains that he must somehow preserve whatever is left of his
personhood. Language is insufficient to explain “la demolizione di un uomo,” but by
connecting his experience with the debasement o f Nimrod and Bocca, Levi is able to get
around the double problem of linguistic and psychological breakdown to convey a
typological sense of his worst experiences in the Lager.
Tony Judt reviews Levi’s concern with the “demolition of a man” by drawing
attention to the description of a child named Hurbinek in Levi’s The Reawakening. The
child was bom in the camps, is unable to move from his atrophied limbs, and has no
language to use. Levi describes how, despite all this, Hurbinek seems very much alive:
. . . his eyes, lost in his triangular and wasted face, flashed terribly alive, full
o f demand, assertion, of the will to break loose, to shatter the tomb of his
dumbness. The speech he lacked, which no one had bothered to teach him,
the need of speech charged his stare with explosive urgency: it was a stare
both savage and human, even mature, a judgement, which none of us could
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support, so heavy was it with force and anguish.. . . Hurbinek, who was
three years old and perhaps had been bom in Auschwitz and had never seen a
tree; Hurbinek, who had fought like a man, to the last breath, to gain his entry
into the world o f men, from which a bestial power had excluded him;
Hurbinek, the nameless, whose tiny forearm—even his—bore the tattoo of
Auschwitz; Hurbinek died in the first days of March 1945, free but not
redeemed. Nothing remains of him: he bears witness through these words of
mine. (Judt 59-60)
Just as Nimrod is restricted and unable to speak, so too is Hurbinek, but in his humility
the child miraculously retains his humanity while the giant is bestialized by the ferocity of
his pride. Unlike Nimrod, Hurbinek is called “free.” Judt notes that “the importance of
language—that we can communicate and we must communicate, that language is vital to
humanity and the deprivation of language the first step to the destruction of a man—was
enforced within the camp” (57). While Hurbinek was deprived of language, Levi invests
the child’s hapless vocalizations with defiant meaning. Levi gives Hurbinek the words he
cannot speak explaining that he was “full of demand, assertion, of the will to break loose,
to shatter the tomb o f his dumbness.” Hurbinek wills communication even without
language whereas Nimrod only fulfils his role in Inferno as a type of Pride. The denial to
conform to the mechanism desired by the Nazis, the assertion of free will demonstrated
by Hurbinek, counters the demolition o f a man through the destruction of language.
As Levi continues his testimony, his sense of the inadequacy of language does not
leave his mind or his narrative. Even as his testimony approaches the moment of his
escape from the Lager, he still reflects on this problem of the meaning of words and the
empty understanding of those who are not survivors. In his opinion,
Come questa nostra fame non è la sensazione di chi ha saltato un pasto, cosi il
nostro modo di aver freddo esigerebbe un nome particolare. Noi diciamo
« f a m e » , diciamo « s ta n c h e z z a » , « p a u r a » , e « d o l o r e » , diciamo
« i n v e r n o » , e sono altre cose. Sono parole libere, create e usate da uomini
liberi che vivevano, godendo e soffrendo, nelle loro case. Se i Lager fossero
durati più a lungo, un nuovo aspro linguaggio sarebbe nato; e di questo si
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sente il bisogno per spiegare cosa e faticare l’intera giomata nel vento, sotto
zero, con solo indosso camicia, mutande, giacca e brache di tela, e in corpo
debolezza e fame e consapevolezza della fine che viene. (Se Questo 110)
[Just as our hunger is not that feeling of missing a meal, so our way of being
cold has need o f a new word. We say ‘hunger’, we say ‘tiredness’, ‘fear’,
‘pain’, we say ‘winter’ and they are different things. They are free words,
created and used by free men who lived in comfort and suffering in their
homes. If the Lagers had lasted longer a new, harsh language would have
been bom; and only this language could express what it means to toil the
whole day in the wind, with the temperature below freezing, wearing only a
shirt, underpants, cloth jacket and trousers, and in one’s body nothing but
weakness, hunger and knowledge of the end drawing nearer.] (Woolf 123)
While Levi can say that he knows these new definitions of words, most of the readers of
his testimony cannot. They are the “uomini liberi che vivevano, godendo e sofffendo,
nelle loro case” and are not the inmates of the Lager. Levi ends his reflection by stating ,
that the knowledge they all have is that “della fine che viene.” ■Levruses all his literary
resources and rhetorical powers to help the reader understand what his experience in the
Lager was, and when language and his memory fail, he turns to Dantean echoes in order
to explicate the pain and suffering and horror.
His testimony famously includes an extended reference to Dante’s Inferno that is
not an echo. The chapter entitled “II Canto di Ulisse” [The Canto of Ulysses] deals with
the recitation o f lines from Inferno 26 that Levi struggles to remember while on a walk at
lunch with Jean the Frenchman to get their soup. The recitation is neither complete nor
completely accurate. Levi is only able to remember nineteen lines from Inferno 26 and he
does not start at the beginning of the canto, remembering only the beginning o f Ulysses’s
speech. Though physically and mentally exhausted in the Lager, he is aided by this
fragment o f the Commedia to answer the questions that he has raised in the previously
mentioned quotations but has been unable to answer.
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After reciting the two-tercet leading to Ulysses’s speech which includes its first
word “Quando” [When] (Inf. 26.85-90), Levi skips over the navigational details of the
hero’s voyage as well as his poignant declaration that he and his shipmates “eravam
vecchi e tardi” [had grown old and slow] (Inf. 26.106). Neither o f these conditions are
worth thinking about in the Lager, nor is it a good idea to remember the other shipmates
from Levi’s previous life. At the beginning o f Levi’s time in the Lager, the Italians agree
to meet weekly, but after a few weeks this ritual stops (Se Questo 32). Banner notes that
“the losses and grave injury to which the Italians had been exposed are intensified by the
poignancy and swiftness of their recognition that memory is a problem, that to be
reminded of the people they once were might only damage them further” (89). Perhaps
this is also why Levi is unable to remember the mention of Ulysses-’-s discussion of his
own family waiting at home for him. Levi cannot imagine his family; he does not have
the mental or physical resources to maintain this form of memory and so skips over it.
Levi has found a way to mediate between remembering the man he was before his capture
and the man he is trying to remain in the Lager. By being able to access his intellectual
past while ignoring his family past, Levi is able to maintain the identity he had before the
Lager without damaging himself further.
The tiny inaccuracies in Levi’s recitation o f what he recalls from this famous setpiece, a speech routinely memorized by Italian schoolchildren to this day, serve to
highlight his deep anxiety about the untrustworthiness of memory. Where Dante has
Ulysses say “quanto veduta non avea alcuna” [higher than any I had ever seen] (Inf.
26.135) in his description of the mysterious mountain glimpsed from his ship, Levi
remembers the line as “che mai veduta non ne avevo alcuna” [I had never seen the like on
any day] (W oolf 114). This misremembering might also be construed as a creative
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misreading, for Levi is striving to express the utter incomparability of what he saw in the
Lager. However, just as Ulysses and his men die, seeing what they had “never” seen
before, Dante is able to give them a voice—he is able to voice the inexpressible. Even if
Levi says “never” because what he sees in the Lager is so incomprehensible, he still .
writes it down and he still tells the story of what he had never seen before. While
translating the Inferno to Jean, he insists that Jean understand every word of the
translation (Se Questo 101). The successful translation of the Inferno and Jean’s helpful
suggestions for clarification indicate that Levi is at least attempting to make the
incomprehensible accessible to human understanding. The change of words in line 135
demonstrates that Levi is facing his fear of being unable to be heard.
Another event that Levi does not recite is the discussion held between Virgil and
Dante about who will speak to Ulysses. Dante is unable to communicate with Ulysses
and so it is Virgil who translates (implicitly) for Ulysses so that Dante can hear the story.
Levi appears to align himself with Virgil while he is translating Ulysses’s speech so that
Jean can hear the story. In his previous allusions to Dante he identifies himself with the
wayward pilgrim in need of guidance rather than with the “maestro” who knows the way.
He also ignores a recitation of Dante-poet’s description of the False Counsellors in
Inferno 26. When Levi recites the lines, he is twice removed from the wisdom of a false
counsellor. His avoidance of this role highlights his own quest to find a reliable guide for
the duration of his stay in the Lager. Just as Dante constructs an allegorical route towards
wisdom out of all the words of all the souls he meets in the afterlife, so Levi must guide
himself and his readers out of the dehumanizing mentality of the camps through the
words of everyone he comes across, no matter how faltering, inadequate, or interrupted
the tale o f his mad journey may seem in the telling or the translation. Levi also isolates
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himself in his incorrect recitation of Ulysses’s account of glimpsing Mount Purgatory.
Dante’s text reads “quando n’apparve una montagna” [when we could see a mountain]
{Inf. 26.133), while Levi’s version switches from the first-person plural to the first-person
singular: “Quando mi apparve una montagna” {Se Questo 102) [When a mountain
appeared to me] (my translation). In this moment, the recitation places Levi in the role of
guide, but as an inmate Levi recognizes himself only as one of many in need of a guide.
Levi is able to reconcile both roles by choosing each role when necessity presents itself.
The “Canto di Ulisse” also demonstrates Levi’s concern with the predictable
failure of language to communicate the full horror of his experiences. As previously
mentioned, he refrains from mentioning that it is Virgil who has to communicate with
Ulysses and not Dante, especially since the previous representative o f linguistic
breakdown is Nimrod, whom Levi and Dante both align with inhumanity. When Levi
tries to recall the line “gitto voce di fuori e disse: ‘Quando . . . ’” [it brought forth a voice
and said: ‘W hen...’] {Inf. 26.90), he alters it to “Mise fuori la voce, e disse: Quando . . . ”
{Se Questo 101) [Threw out a voice and answered: “When . . . ”] (Woolf 112). Levi puts
the word “fuori” [outside] before the word “voce” [voice] whereas Dante chooses to write
“voice” first and “outside” second. Levi’s concern is so pressing that before he can speak
o f a voice he must first speak of being outside that voice. At the same time, when Dante
writes “infin che T mar fu sovra noi richiuso" [until the sea closed over us] {Inf. 26.142,
italics added) Levi writes “infin che T mar fu sopra noi rinchiuso” {Se Questo 103, italics
added) [And over our heads the hollow seas closed up] (Woolf 115). Dante’s choice of
“richiuso” connotes the locking of something in again but Levi’s choice of “rinchiuso”
connotes the locking of someone in again. Whereas Dante sees the soul as something to
be locked in again, Levi sees Ulysses as being trapped in a cell. Perhaps, for Levi, there
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is no way to reconcile being both inside as a survivor and outside as a survivor. He is
only able to tell his narrative because he survived the Lager, which also means that he did
not experience all the horrors of the camp (such as the gas chambers). His voice is also
outside o f what others want to hear. Levi wants Jean to understand
Chi è Dante. Che cosa è la Commedia. Quale sensazione curiosa di novità si
prova, se si cerca di spiegare in breve che cosa è la Divina Commedia. Come
è distribuito l’Inferno, cosa è il contrappasso. Virgilio è la Ragione, Beatrice
è la Teologia. (Se Questo 101)
[Who is Dante? What is the Comedy? That curious sensation of novelty
which one feels if one tries to explain briefly what is the Divine Comedy.
How the Inferno is divided up, what are its punishments. Virgil is Reason,
Beatrice is Theology.] (Woolf 112) ;
Levi’s attempt to recite Inferno 26 does not answer all of these questions. He does not
have enough time to conduct a learned discussion with Jean about the relation between
Reason and Theology in the Commedia. Instead, he does what he can. He recites what
he can remember and uses the recitation to lift his spirits and to teach Jean a little Italian.
While Levi is unable to answer all the questions raised by the speech of Ulysses or to
explain everything that occurred during his time in the Lager, he does answer a few
questions and this effort, in the “Canto of Ulysses,” is enough for Levi to become
spiritually uplifted.
At the end of Se Questo È un Uomo, Levi reflects on his time in the camps and his
amazement at being free. He speaks o f the Russians arriving and how, despite being in
the Lager, they all think of “salvamenti biblici nelle avversità estreme” (Se Questo 140)
[biblical salvations in times of extreme adversity] (Woolf 158). Levi’s time in the camps
has finished and until he returns to write his memoir, he does not need to expand upon his
engagement with Inferno, preferring to adopt a more hopeful outlook, on his life after the
Hell of Auschwitz. Against all odds, Levi fights against the Nazis’ system of human
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destruction and his own individual demolition by combating the despair felt at being left
alone in the camps at the end of the war. By preserving in himself the very humanity that
the Nazis sought to destroy, he can set out towards a future unmarred by the injustice of
the Third Reich. While Levi alludes to the Inferno in order to express the feelings he is
unable to put into his own words, what may surprise the reader is that his references to the
Inferno axe concerned with Limbo as well as with the voyage of Ulysses. His prevailing
concern is with his own life in the Here and Now, not with someone else’s afterlife
(however vividly imagined) or with the relationship between the punished and the
punishers (as one might expect from a Jewish inmate). While his initial focus on Limbo
suggests a preoccupation with his perilous status as an intellectual in the camps, his
deeper interest in the canto of Ulysses reveals his philosophical quest to deploy memory
in the heroic fight to cling on to his humanity. Then in his final meditation on his time in
the camp and of his rescue, he turns away from infernal images of condemnation towards
the blessed possibility of a perfectly ordinary social life. Just as Dante moves from Hell
to Purgatory, Levi also manages to escape the prison into which he entered unwillingly,
and with uncertain steps, to push himself back towards the horizon of hope.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Memory of Stronger Nails: Andrzej Wajda’s Kanat and Dante’s Purgatorio

Critical responses to Kanal, Andrzej Wajda’s film about the Warsaw Uprising
(August - October 1944), were remarkably varied at the time of its release in 1957. Some
reviewers pessimistically complained that Wajda had destroyed a heroic moment in
Polish history, while others fervently hoped that Kanalmight send an encouraging
message to the Polish public (if not to the world at large) about humanity’s spiritual
capacity to recover from the War. One critic mused that “maybe Kanal will mark the
beginning of the truth being told about history, about ourselves, about a whole generation.
Perhaps it will prove to be art as warning, art as purgation, a triumph-of the heroism of
life over the heroism o f death?” (Michalek 36). While none of the escapees in the film
survives, their collective quest for liberation from the madness and despair of occupied
Warsaw is represented as unquestionably noble. Instead of mythologizing the real men
[

and women who attempted to escape through the sewers, the film seeks to allegorize their
journey both typologically and tropologically. If the tragic outcome of the escape
prevents any clear access to anagogic interpretations of the film, it should come as no
surprise: a pre-eminently modem (and Modernist) art form like the cinema is an unlikely
vehicle for delivering mystical truths about the afterlife. Eternity lies perversely beyond
the scope of moving pictures. Nevertheless, as an allegorical film, Kanat raises the moral
perspective o f its viewers beyond the confusion of historical events and the clash of
political wills towards a purgatorial vision of art—most notably the art of the cinema—as
an oracular therapeutic means to reveal and redress the traumatizing truth about war as
“the heroism of death.”
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While a narrative trajectory through the mucky sewers beneath Warsaw is apt to
suggest an underworld journey such as Dante’s descent through the Inferno, Wajda
surprisingly looks back at the Warsaw Uprising through the lens of Purgatorio. Infernal
despair would have been all too easy an emotion for the filmmaker to play up or to play
on in his recreation of the escape, and he certainly addresses it as a dangerous possibility
for both his characters and his viewers. From the start, however, the moral “impeto”
behind his project is humanity’s invincible hope o f deliverance from evil. ,
The opening scene in Kanal ironically shows the Nazis extinguishing fires in
Warsaw as if they were seeking to preserve or rebuild it. Then, when the main characters
o f the platoon are introduced, the narrator explains that one of the soldiers, Korab, suffers
without his daily bath (00:03:59). The next time Korab appears irt the film, he is washing
himself. Washing is a key image in Purgatorio. Before Dante begins his ascent o f the
Holy Mountain, Virgil commands him to clean off the dirt of the Inferno (Purg. 1.95).
There is no such command in Inferno, only an initiation into the mire of Hell. If any
space explicitly corresponds to Hell in Kanal, it is Warsaw. When Lieutenant Zadra
makes his first appearance in the film, his colonel bluntly informs him that their
stronghold is Hell. “Yes, that’s always an option,” he replies (00:08:34). This somewhat
enigmatic response opens up the possibility of a counter-gloss on the scene: perhaps
Warsaw might be perceived from another tropological perspective as a purgatorial space
o f patient endurance and ultimate deliverance.
When the platoon receives the order to retreat through the sewers, Lieutenant
Madry, the second in command, gets drunk before departure in order to drown his
feelings o f despair at the prospect of defeat. When Zadra confronts him, Madry remarks
that he will “sober up” on his way downtown (00:38:40). While the drunkenness can be
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seen as an infernal act o f despair, the recognition that the journey through the sewers will
help Madry clear his mind opens up once again the possibility of a purgatorial way of
reading their difficult journey. The top of Mount Purgatory is where souls enter Lethe
and Eunoe in order to cleanse their minds for the ascent to Paradise. Both Madry and the
purged souls share the characteristic o f arriving at the end of their journey with a clear
mind, ready for the final ascent (whether to Wilcza street or to Paradise). In the streets of
Warsaw we see a crowd waiting to be taken into the sewers (00:43:00), much like the
souls waiting to be ferried across by Charon (Inf. 3.74); later in the film, when Korab and
Stokrotka are underground, Korab remarks that the sewers appear as “a dark and fragrant
forest” (01:10:32). The Dark Wood at the start of Inferno is here strangely merged with
the fragrant forest found at the top of Mount Purgatory as if to imply that Dante’s “hope
of the heights” (Inf. 1.54) might be recovered even in the depths of the Warsaw sewers.
The final actions of Lieutenant Zadra in the film also suggest a hope beyond
despair. When Zadra and Kula climb out of the sewers, Zadra discovers that Kula has
lied about the men of the platoon following them. Zadra shoots Kula for his lies and then
re-enters the sewers to find the platoon (01:34:18). The identification of Kula as a traitor
is revealed to Zadra outside the sewers, and therefore the apparent descent back into the
sewers renews Zadra’s hope of helping his platoon, just as Dante appears to climb down
Satan’s body only to discover that he is moving up towards Purgatorio. While, as
Falkowska notes, this event demonstrates “the themes of Christian sacrifice and of
senseless carnage,” Zadra’s decision to return to the sewers demonstrates his hope that
heroic self-sacrifice might lead to deliverance for the escapees just as Christ’s Passion
and Descent into Hell led to the Redemption. In a war-tom Warsaw, however, Zadra
feels it is his duty to administer the punishment to Kula, whereas Christ would not have
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killed anyone. In this sense Zadra has not achieved full purgation and must therefore
descend into the sewers again. While Zadra’s return to the sewers entails a physical
descent, the physical descent in Inferno turns out to be an ascent towards purgation:
Zadra’s actions can therefore also appear as purgative, mirroring the moral inversion of
Dante’s infernal journey.
Halinka’s suicide is another seemingly infernal moment in the film for which a
purgatorial meaning emerges. Dante makes clear the place of suicides in the Seventh
Circle, but the final image of Halinka, where she is looking up and off into the distance as
if she is contemplating God, suggests an ascent towards salvation. The gun shot is fired
in darkness, and when Madry shines his light on her the viewer sees Halinka looking
upwards and at peace, not distraught. As Falkowska notes, in Karial
Love— a source of strength and the wellspring of life—is also betrayed in the
relationship between Halinka and Madry, when the latter suddenly announces
to his young lover that he has a wife and children. Crushed and mortified,
Halinka shoots herself. The other soldiers feel similarly disenchanted by his
duplicity, and they are rendered powerless by the combined weight of
hardship, the German oppressor’s cunning, and this final betrayal. (48)
Halinka’s suicide removes the reminder of this “final betrayal” from the minds of the
soldiers, allowing them to regain some power. Halinka’s love, not for Madry but for the
platoon, provides the impetus for her suicide. Tellingly, the last shot of her focuses on
her eyes, open, looking up.
Perhaps the Dantean character to whom Halinka most closely corresponds is St.
Lucy, who is mentioned by Beatrice in Inferno 2 (97-100) and encountered by Virgil in
Purgatorio 9 (55-7). Lucy is still venerated by Catholics as the patron saint o f the blind
because she ripped out her own eyes so that a man distracted by their beauty would be
able to focus instead on the beauty of God (Craughwell 167). Halinka stands for this
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same attempt to remind Madry o f the correct path. Since Madry turns from his wife and
children to Halinka, she arguably removes the attraction in order for Madry to succeed in
his purgation. While Lucy is retrospectively presented as one of the saints most
concerned for Dante’s soul, she intercedes in a physical sense only once during his
journey. After he falls asleep on the slope overlooking the Valley of the Princes, she lifts
him up in her arms and conveys him to the foot of the stairs leading to the Gate of
Purgatory Proper.

While love is seen as “a source of strength and the wellspring of life”

in Kanal it is so only if the motivation behind it is selfless. Where Madry’s selfish
misplaced love leads to despair and betrayal, Halinka’s ardent devotion to the platoon
expresses itself in a zealously disciplined effort to help everyone in her company escape
the sewers.

.

--

, Wajda also focuses our tropological attention on the love between Korab and
Stokrotka, in so far as it corresponds typologically to the love of Dante and Beatrice. One
o f the first things Stokrotka says to Korab when she returns from her role in the Polish
Resistance is to tell him that she is his messenger (00:22:20). Beatrice comes to Dante as
a messenger from the Virgin Mary who, along with all the saints, is eager to help him
traverse the heavens and unite his soul with God. After Korab is shot in an act of fighting
against the Germans, he is weakened and Zadra remarks that for Korab to make the trip
through the sewers he “needs two strong men.” But it is Stokrotka who volunteers to help
him through the sewers. Just as gender inversion occurs frequently in Dante’s
interactions with Beatrice, Stokrotka follows Beatrice’s lead in assuming the powers of a
strong masculine saviour. After volunteering to help Korab, Stokrotka remarks to Zadra
that “the way is pretty easy” and so the platoon does not need her as their guide
(00:40:35). Beatrice is Dante’s personal saint and guide through Paradiso, just as
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Stokrotka becomes Korab’s personal guide through the sewers. Stokrotka, as Elzbieta
Ostrowska notes,
brings from the very beginning a clearly defined femininity and sexuality,
they can only be revealed when she is looking death ‘in the eyes’, when
Korab is o n ‘the other side of the bars’. Their single desperate kiss is, as it
were, a passage to a different dimension of reality, or fleeting witness to a
finite reality they will soon have to leave. (49)
Transcending her earthly role as a lover and guide, Stokrotka becomes Korab’s “Kanal”
to a higher reality just as Beatrice became Dante’s “porta” to the Divine Presence.
To move from Purgatory to Paradise, Dante must first be submerged in the River
Lethe and then brought to its companion stream, Eunoe, to taste the pure waters of Grace.
The composer Michal alludes to Lethe when he stops with Madry and Halinka to drink
from Madry’s canteen. Michal states that the water he is drinking is-from “Lethe, the river
o f oblivion” (00:58:55). The water relieves his thirst and its Dantean associations remove
him, at least temporarily, from the sewers. As the three continue their journey they come
across an escape route from the sewers, and Michal remarks, watching the men and
women clamber over each other to climb the ladder: “thither we came, and thence down
in the moat I saw a people smothered in a filth that out of human privies sèemed to flow”
(01:00:15). He is recollecting Dante’s glimpse o f the Flatterers in Malebolge:
Quivi venimmo; e quindi giù nel fosso
vidi gente attuffata in uno sterco
che da li uman privadi parea mosso.
[We went up, and from there I could see,
in a ditch below, people plunged in excrement
that could have come from human privies.] (Inf. 18.112-4)

:

Though the Lethe passage in Purgatorio is still fresh in his mind, Michal cannot help but
recognize the infernal situation in which he finds himself. Moments after he quotes
Dante, however, he asks Madry and Halinka if they can hear the music he is hearing,
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saying that everything in the sewers is singing. When Madry responds sarcastically with
“yeah, and maybe you’re seeing angels too?” (01:02:29) Michal does not respond but
instead wanders off in search of the music and presumably the angels Madry has
suggested. Music and angels are commonly associated with Purgatory and Paradise.10
While Michal observes an infernal scene, he prefers to recognize his journey as belonging
to a place where he can find angels, music, and the river Lethe— all located on the Holy
Mountain.
/

He glances back at Dante’s Hell only once, quoting Inferno 18 when he is
observing men and women trying to escape from the sewers. While Michal is in the
sewers, he recognizes the river of sewage as representing Lethe but an attempt at an
escape above ground as a moment worthy of Inferno. The descent into the sewers
suggests a downwards movement just as Dante fails to climb the hill at the beginning of
Inferno and therefore must descend into the circles of Hell. In Kanal, however, the
sewers resonate with Purgatorio more than with Inferno. Just as Zadra discovers Hell is
above the sewers when he escapes with Kula, Michal finds that the world below—for all
its infernal appearance— is a route of purgatorial purification and enlightenment.
Countering this reading is Ostrowska’s argument that the platoon’s descent into
the sewers is a move from purgation to chaos. She notes that
before they descend into the hellish sewers and the silence and horror of the
canals, the platoon has to go through the purgatory of witnessing the
expulsion from the ghetto: shouts, mayhem, people attacked by German
soldiers, and mothers and children running through the fires. (47)

10 Fallen angels are found in Inferno, and an angel is sent to help Dante and Virgil open the gates to the City
o f Dis, but the fallen angels are not heavenly messengers able to aid souls and the angel who opens the
gates does not remain in Hell, showing disgust the entire time he is forced to be there.
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This is however the norm for occupied Warsaw and it is not until the victims begin to act
like Nazis themselves, without the immediate influence of the Germans, that Michal
remarks on their infernal behaviour. While Ostrowska suggests that the purgation
happens on the streets of Warsaw, Michal seems to disagree. He also seems to hear
music and singing whereas Ostrowska describes the canals as being silent and filled with
horror. Ostrowska continues her analysis by noting that the film sequences in the sewers
take up only half of [the film’s] entire length. The film is ideally balanced
between the scenes set above- and below-ground. Furthermore, the events in
the canals are not merely gruesome wanderings in the dark; they are carefully
structured scenes placed around moments o f hope and despair. (47)
While Purgatorio may aptly be described as a series of “carefully structured scenes
placed around moments o f hope and despair,” the same cannot be said of Inferno. Hope
is not an option for the Damned, with the notable exception of Virgil who has witnessed
the Harrowing and received Beatrice’s assurance that she will put in a good word for him
with her all-powerful “segnor” (Inf. 2.73-4). Michal’s references to Lethe and to resonant
song strongly suggest that he is looking beyond the sewers to a place of atonement and
liberation from despair.
Ostrowska has also noted Michal’s unique role as a composer. When Michal is
waiting to depart into the sewers, he is asked to play the piano. “In contrast to the distant
machine-gun fire, this haunting piano tune is a reminder of a remote past in which life
bore some semblance of normalcy,” argues Ostrowska: “Amid the general destruction and
the filth, Michal’s music is ethereal, like an intrusion from another world” (45). Clearly
by claiming to hear ethereal music in the sewers, the composer is reprising his role as a
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spiritual guide to “another world.”11 Michal’s final act is to pass by Korab and Stokrotka
as they begin to weaken, as they approach the end ofthe sewers (01:17:44). This act
serves as a reminder to Korab and Stokrotka that they are travelling through the sewers
because escape has been promised to them. Michal perceives the sewers as a route
towards salvation rather than damnation. The souls he sees clambering to escape strike
him as moving backwards to damnation—which he associates with the streets where the
Germans act out “the heroism of death” with demonic ferocity, and where the Poles fight
each other rather than the Nazi occupiers.
Interpreting Kanal as a critique of the heroic conventions of Polish war-films,
f

Ostrowska points out that the
Romantic tradition of the immaculately dressed and impeccably well-kept
warrior has been completely subverted by Wajda, whose soldiers are dirty,
weak, and petty; preoccupied with mundane personal affairs and conflicts.
Wajda’s formulation is quite important in light of the conventional,
romanticized view of the uprising, which the film seemingly abrogates. (51)
Wajda wanted to provide the viewer with the “brutal truth o f the Warsaw Uprising” (49).
He could not do this if he followed the “romantic tradition of the immaculately dressed
I

and impeccably well-kept warrior.” In fact, the character who seems to transcend this
romanticized view o f the Resistance-fighter, commenting on the need for oblivion, is not
a soldier at all but the composer Michal. Korab declares that Michal is not a soldier,
noting that it would be a “pity to lose an artist” (00:19:40). Korab’s recognition of
Michal’s civilian status (even though he is fighting in the platoon) demonstrates Wajda’s
rejection o f the conventionally idealistic portrayal of the Warsaw Uprising. This

11 Michat’s closest counterpart in the Commedia is Orpheus, the musician who descends into Hell to rescue
his wife only to fail by turning to look back at the gates when he has been instructed not to turn around.
The music Orpheus plays transfixes the Damned whereas Michal’s music spurs Korab and Stokrotka
forwards. The allusion to Orpheus serves to demonstrate the different purpose Michal serves.
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inversion also suggests that Wajda sees nothing strange in identifying the descent through
the sewers with Purgatorio and the ascent to the streets with Inferno.
Wajda’s attack on the Romantic idealization of Polish military history can also be
sensed in the conversation between Stokrotka and Korab during their trek through the
sewers. Korab begins by asking about her life before the resistance and what she wants to
do after the war, but Stokrotka refuses to answer (00:50:00-00:51:19). She instead tells
him to focus on the goal of their impending journey: release from the sewers. Beatrice
also reprimands Dante for focusing on the wrong things when she confronts him at the
top o f Purgatory:

,

. . . “Per entro i mie’ disiri,
che ti menavano ad amar lo bene
di la dal quai non e a che s’aspiri,

...

quai fossi attraversati o quai catene
trovasti, per che del passare innanzi
dovessiti cosi spogliar la spene?
E quali agevolezze o quali avanzi
ne la fronte de li altri si mostraro,
per che dovessi lor passeggiare anzi?”
[.. . ‘In your desire for me
that guided you to love that good
beyond which there is nothing left to long for,
‘what ditches or what chains did you encounter
across your path to make you cast aside
all hope of going forward?
‘And what profit or advantage showed
in the face of other things so that you felt
you must parade yourself before them?’] (Purg. 31.22-30)
Korab professes his love for Stokrotka as ardently as Dante did for Beatrice, but like the
pilgrim, Korab is focused on the wrong questions. If he followed the advice and example
o f his beloved, he would direct his efforts to seeking a way out of the sewers and a way
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forward in the Resistance. For Stokrotka, being close to death in the sewers is not an
excuse for focusing on anything other than the right path. Only through Stokrotka’s
“impeto” is Korab able to resume the journey through the sewers just as Beatrice’s harsh
words are what spur Dante back onto the correct path o f repentance. Dante is usually
able to look beyond worldly distractions simply by gazing into Beatrice’s eyes, but in
Kanal Stokrotka tells Korab that he must focus on the journey and not on her. She leads
him along the right path, but for Stokrotka the larger picture is the Resistance and the
importance of escaping the sewers to continue that fight. This striking difference
provides Wajda with an opportunity to comment on the Resistance Movement as a cause
more ennobling (and politically more compelling) than love. His political exaltation of loyalty as a Resistance virtue gains much of its moral force from the.typological
precedent of Beatrice’s first speech to Dante about his disloyalty to her saintly memory
(Purg. 30.127-35).
When Michal crosses Stokrotka’s and Korab’s path near the end of the journey,
Korab is unable to remember him or the platoon (01:18:17). After Dante has plunged into
Lethe and Beatrice confronts him, he is also unable to remember why Beatrice is so angry
with him. Beatrice demands an explanation from Dante:
. . . “Che pense?
Rispondi a me; che le memorie triste
inte nonsono ancor d a l’acquaoffense.”
[ . . . ‘What are you thinking? Speak, for your memories
of sin have not been washed away by water yet. ’] (Purg. 31.10-2)
The “memorie triste” are Dante’s regretful recollections of his sins. In Kanal, however,
the “memorie triste” impeding Michal’s progress are his recollections of the streets of
Warsaw before his entrance into the sewers. By the time Korab exclaims that he cannot
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remember a thing, Michal has already become delirious and is beyond salvation,
wandering past them without acknowledgement. Stokrotka nevertheless forces him to
remember Michal and then tells him to “stop snivelling” when Korab realizes that Michal
has been lost (01:18:17). Like Beatrice, Stokrotka insists on the therapeutic need to
recover “memorie triste” in order to get over them. Dante and Korab can better
understand their current position and the importance of continuing their respective
journeys only through remembering. The shame and regretfulness associated with
“memorie triste” can only be dispelled by confronting the memories and pushing beyond
them.
After Dante returns to the “memorie triste,” he is able to repent in front of
Beatrice and can then be submerged in Eunoe to cleanse himself of any pain associated
with his sins. As Beatrice notes:
Alto fato di Dio sarebbe rotto,
se Lete si passasse e tal vivanda
fosse gustata sanza alcuno scotto
di pentimento che lagrime spanda.”

.

[‘Broken would be the high decree of God
should Lethe be crossed and its sustenance
be tasted without payment o f some fee:
; his penitence that shows itself in tears.’] (Purg. 30.142-5)

v

Beatrice demands this repentance from Dante by assuming the role of his confessor.
After the confession Beatrice takes Dante through Eunoe and up to Paradise with its river
o f light. When Korab and Stokrotka arrive at the Vistula River, Korab begins to confess
his sins to Stokrotka (01:22:42). After serving as his confessor, Stokrotka reassures
Korab of his forgiveness by describing what she sees beyond the barred exit from the
sewers. In both cases the woman takes on the role of confessor in order to help her male
compatriot ascend to the next world. For Dante, the next world is Paradise; and for
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Korab, it is death. The love linking the female confessor to the male penitent is only a
starting point to move away from the intimacy of the couple towards unification with the
entire nation. Korab’s repentance and confession symbolize his readiness to pass beyond
the world o f the living. The confession acts almost as a last rite. Just as Halinka’s
suicide points upwards Korab’s death becomes a way to transcend the horror of the war
and to find hope in a moment of despair.
Wajda’s desire to unify individuals through a national identity is another way he
aligns himself with Dante. Wajda’s personal objectives for his role in Polish society as a
defender o f Poland’s political and national identity connect readily with Dante’s desire to
be the poet-prophet of a united Italy. Boleslaw Michalek notes that
Kanal straddles a gulf between the realism of actual events with characters
who are reasonably faithful portraits of the mentality and attitudes of the time,
and an almost abstract vision of a sealed world whose inhabitants are doomed
to extinction. Inevitably a parallel was drawn with Dante’s “Inferno” - b y
Wajda himself as well as reviewers— and it is true that the film is permeated
by a virtually unrelieved mood of despair, bitterness and resignation. The
whole structure is pivoted on the idea that there is no way out, no hope, no
chance o f deliverance. As in Dante there is only a succession of narrowing
circles o f torment. (29-30)
While reviewers were quick to note the obvious parallels between Kanal and Inferno,
Wajda himself pointed to Purgatorio as the source of his moral and political inspiration.
As previously noted, he intended his film to help the Poles “express their real hopes and
desires.” If Kanal had offered them “no way out, no hope, no chance of deliverance,”
then it would have been a failure in his eyes. He seems to have concurred with
Michalek’s judgment that Kanal is a striking illustration of “art as purgation.”
Wajda is clear that his role as director is to represent Poland and to demonstrate the
moral importance of a strong independent national identity. In an interview Wajda stated
that
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Poland must be the base from which I work., I will go even further to say that
only then can my work have any meaning. I am convinced that Poland will
have something to say as regards today’s world. Therefore it is important to
me to be a director in Poland and to remain involved with that country.
(Karpinski 13)
One can see easily then how Dante’s Commedia would appeal to a man trying to reach
the world stage to communicate political ideas about freedom, unity, and peace.
Like Dante, Wajda looks at the world from the perspective of a war-wearied exile.
According to John Orr,
Wajda joined the Home Army, in which he performed the function of a
liaison officer (courier), a duty customary for boys of his age. He was nearly
arrested by the Germans for these activities, and as a result was forced to flee
Radom for Krakow, where he lived for some time; there he continued his
involvement in Home Army activities and was again nearly arrested by the
Germans. (Crossroads 13)
Wajda’s desire to serve Poland caused him to flee his hometown for the sake of survival.
While he was able to remain in Poland, he did so at his own risk and was almost arrested
in Krakow on one occasion. Rather than abandon his homeland at the hour of her greatest
need, he stalwartly joined the Resistance in the hope that Poland would eventually
liberate herself from the Nazi regime.
,

:

. .

\

Dante also remains concerned about the direction Italy will take after his exile.
The comments or prophecies made in Inferno, however, do not lend themselves to hope.
The condemned souls who tell Dante-pilgrim of his exile do so only to harm him. In the
Circle of the ,Gluttons, for instance, Ciacco tells the pilgrim about his impending exile
only to confuse and worry him. Concerned for the political health of Florence, Dante
asks Ciacco to tell him why the factions in their city cannot get along. Instead o f offering
any solutions to the fractious state of Florentine society, Ciacco tells Dante how his exile
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will occur {Inf. 6.64-76) in order to make him lose hope. Ciacco’s hateful prophecy is
expanded by Vanni Fucci in the Bolgia of the Thieves :
e con tempesta impetuosa e agra
sovra Campo Picen fia combattuto;
ond’ei repente spezzerà la nebbia,
sì ch’ogne Bianco ne sarà feruto.
E detto l’ho perché doler ti debbia!”
[and, with violent and stinging storms,
‘on Campo Piceno the battle shall be joined.
The headlong bolt shall rend the clouds,
striking and wounding every White.
And this I have told that it may make you grieve.’] {Inf. 24.147-51)
Struck with impetuous violence himself, Vanni Fucci strikes back at Dante by describing
his exile in violent terms.
The prophecies of exile in Purgatorio are more hopeful. One can understand
why Wajda would turn from Inferno to Purgatorio for consolation at a time when he was
suffering the same political fate as the author of the Commedia. On the slopes of
Antepurgatory, following a discussion of the consequences of pride, the Ghibelline
nobleman Currado Malaspina warns Dante
“Or va; che T sol non si ricorca
sette volte nel letto che T Montone
con tutti e quattro i piè cuopre e inforca,
che cotesta cortese oppinione
ti fra chiavata in mezzo de la testa
con maggior chiovi che d’altrui sermone,
se corso di giudicio non s’arresta.”
[‘Enough. Not seven times
shall the sun return to rest in the bed
the Ram covers and bestrides with all four feet
‘before this courteous opinion
shall be nailed within your brain
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by stronger nails than the words o f others,
if the course o f Judgment is not stayed.’] (Purg. 8.133-9)
This admonition is not intended to harm Dante. Currado’s homily on pride benevolently
reassures the pilgrim that his exile is not due to God’s decree but to the treacherous
machinations of his political enemies. A period of earthly exile will not prevent Dante
from ascending to Heaven if he remembers whose decree truly matters. He must use the
“maggior chiovi” in order to remain committed to his journey. Provenzan Saivani also
cautions Dante not to perceive his exile as a devastating blow, noting that
Più non dirò, e scuro so che parlo;
ma poco tempo andrà, che ’ tuoi vicini
faranno sì che tu potrai chiosarlo.
[T say no more, and know my speech obscure.
It won’t be long before they act, your townsmen,
in such a way that you’ll know how to gloss it.] {Purg. 11.139-41)
Before his death Provenzan had repented of his pride and humbly begged for alms in the
marketplace of Siena. What Dante learns from his example is that even though his
neighbours may act poorly and he may be forced to become a beggar, the actions that
truly matter are his own. The moral actions that saved Provenzan from damnation were
his own and no one else’s. Wajda, while in exile, no doubt recalled the hopeful
prophecies of the Purgatorians in order to remind himself that he “must remain involved”
with Poland, even if Poland no longer wanted to be involved with him.
For Wajda, national identity is defined by the geography of Poland
for which one must fight. In a country ravaged by partitions, annexations,
and wars, the demonstration of national feelings has historically been related
to the fight for the country’s independence. In the case of Poland, national
identity has always had a specific territorial link—after all, Poland has not
existed (geographically, at least) for over two hundred years. (Ostrowska 52)
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Liberation from Germany then also becomes a struggle to remove the Germans from the
nation’s,borders. This may also be why Kanal takes place solely in Warsaw, and why the
goal is escape to the center o f the city and not out o f the city. The beginning o f the film
has a list of all the locations where the Home Army was fighting against the Germans,
reminding viewers that Warsaw is the last standing city of resistance (00:03:03). For
Wajda, the Polish Resistance is defined not only by the Poles participating in the
resistance but also by the different Polish locations where they are fighting. The close,
association o f national identity with geography is also present in the Commedia,
especially in Purgatorio. When Dante is questioned about who he is by Guido del Duca
and Rinieri, he identifies his birthplace in Italy but conceals the name of the river Amo.
Guido and Rinieri challenge him to explain why he concealed the river’s name and then
continue to identify Tuscany through its rivers and mountains and valleys in an attempt to
highlight the fallen state o f Italy. Guido uses the myth of Circe to remind Dante that the
citizens in various communities along the Amo behave more like beasts than men,
transforming themselves into pigs, dogs, wolves, and foxes, because they are not worried
about the perilous state o f their souls. Guido ends the discussion by stating that it will
take over a thousand years before the cities along the Arno will be able to recover {Purg.
14.29-66). He goes on to complain that Italy has grown so sinful
. . . che di qui a mille anni
ne lo stato primaio non si rinselva.”
[ . . . that not one thousand years
will make the trees grow green as once they were.’] {Purg. 14.65-6)
For Guido, the geography of Italy is momentarily internalized as if the Italians have lost
all hope o f salvation. But this dire vision does not now include him, for he is an
inhabitant of Purgatory and a penitent beyond the borders of despair. Wajda, when
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highlighting the different locations that have fallen to the German army, describes his
fellow citizens as having fallen in violence and flames just as the souls Guido speaks of
are “sanguinose” [covered in blood]. Guido’s lament also seems to mirror the plot of
Kanal on a physical level. The platoon begins on a hill and descends at the end of the
film to reconnect with the outside world by arriving at the Vistula River. In the sewers
the composer witnesses the disappearance of virtue, first with Madry’s attack on the
panicking woman and then with his confession of adultery. His subsequent vision of the
filthy men and women fighting each other rather than the enemy as they scramble to leave
the sewers harks back to Guido’s 0 vidian vision of the Casentine villagers as
. . . brutti porci, piu degni di galle
che d’altro cibo fatto in uman uso[.]
[ . . . filthy hogs, more fitto feed on acoms
than on any food that is prepared for men . . . . ] {Purg. 14.43-4)
They are acting more like animals than human beings and therefore are identified with the
sinners o f Italy and not with the penitent Purgatorians. When Guido finally laments that
“che di qui a mille anni / ne lo stato primaio non si rinselva,” a correspondence is
suggested between Dante’s savagely transformed Italy and Wajda’s war-tom Poland.
Pre-war Poland has all but receded over the horizon of oblivion. Modem Poland will
have to rebuild herself, and it will take a long time before “lo stato primaio” can be
restored.

. •

From his purgatorial perspective, Guido still conveys a hopeful message,
encouraging Dante-poet to spread word of his conversion so that other sinners may be
saved. Wajda also hopes that he will be able to speak to the Polish public and address his
concerns about a nation that needs to reunite. Looking back on his early films, he
reflected on the political usefulness of his chosen medium:
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cinema helps me perform a particular [political] task. I want the country to
submit to certain changes and films can decidedly help. They are very
appropriate because, as a violent yet popular form of art, they can convey
these ideas better than anything else. (Karpinski 11)
The political films in which Wajda first worked out his vision of Poland’s reunification
were part of a film movement following World War II. While they are hardly
masterpieces, “each of these new films . . . tried to mesh individual experience with the
mechanism of the community’s destinies and, in so doing, carved out a new place for the
cinema” (Michalek 13). As a director Wajda strives to mesh his individual experiences
with the mechanism of the community’s destinies just as Dante-poet sees himself as the
poet-prophet whose unique experiences can help Italy “submit to certain changes” for the
sake of unity and peace.
Dante’s prophetic invention of the cinema as an aesthetic resolution to the
Paragone, the discordant competition between words and images, would surely also have
drawn Wajda’s directorial attention to Purgatorio. When Dante arrives at the terrace of
the Proud, he is amazed to find images carved in the marble ,walls which seem to be
speaking to him:

;
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Colui che mai non vide cosa nova
produsse esto visibile parlare,
novello a noi perché qui non si trova.
[He in whose sight nothing can be new
wrought this speech made visible,
new to us because it is not found on earth.] (Purg. 10.94-6)
The animated figures in the bas-relief provide him with exemplars of humility, and while
this particular virtue may not have appealed to Wajda personally, the effect that these
moving and speaking images have on Dante would attract the attention of a filmmaker
who was looking for a strong way to present his message. Wajda is a fervent supporter of
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national cinema and believes in the power of cinema, stating that to sway public opinion
on important political issues. “Cinema is not only spoken language,” he reminds his
viewers: “It is also an art of images” (Orr, Forward xvi). Though Dante depends on
language as the medium for conveying allegorical meanings, he is also well aware of the
power o f visual imagery to communicate divine messages. From his medieval
theological perspective, the miraculously mimetic combination of words and images on
the white marble wall could only be the work of the Supreme Artist, God. It was not yet
a human “arte.”
Michalek comments that “the evolution of cinema betw een^ Generation in 1955
and Kanal in 1957 was, however, quite another thing. Wajda’s treatment of the Warsaw Rising and the retreat through the sewers had a definite and deliberate historical and
social edge” (30). The narrative from which Kanal was developed is described
conversely as
sober, balanced, and frankly sympathetic to the soldiers of the Home Army,
though tempered by a streak of scepticism as to the purpose and price of their
heroism. A certain critical attitude to the traditional image of Polish heroism
forms an undercurrent to much o f [Stawinski’s] fiction. (Michalek 25)
While the critical attitude to the traditional image of Polish heroism seeks to provoke
sympathy for the soldier of the Home Army, Wajda’s film instead presents a “deliberate
historical and social” message about the acts during the Warsaw Uprising. Michalek
continues by stating that Stawinski’s narratives “are a fictionalised account o f this
horrifying, subterranean trek [through the sewers], alternating between hope and despair,
through a labyrinth bristling with German booby-traps and stinking of excrement—
something of a contemporary vision of hell” (25). Kanat, however, seeks to deliver a
bolder message than just a “fictionalised account” of the escape Stawinski experienced.
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Reflecting on the audaciously allegorical design of Kanat, Wajda confirms that
while he was directly communicating with Poles about their history he also wanted the
rest of the world to contemplate the broad implications of his recreation of the Warsaw
Uprising. “It was very important,” he explains,
that our voice was heard on the other side of the Iron Curtain too. We felt
then that the Polish cinema had a duty not only to speak about itself but also
to communicate with those on the other side in the Cold War. We wanted to
speak with the voice o f our neighbours who then still did not have their own
cinemas or at least were not yet accorded recognition. I think our mission
succeeded. Our war films showed the truth about the Polish ‘October’ in
1956 to those on the other side o f the Iron Curtain, and later our films in,
August 1980 let the world know that something fundamental was happening
in Poland. (Orr, Forward xii)
This concern with delivering a message to the world is suggested throughout the film by the many images of pages scattered all over the ground in the streets-of Warsaw. At the
beginning o f the film the ground defended by the platoon is covered with white pages
(00:04:50). Then, when Wajda’s camera pans over the cemetery, again we see pages
littered all over the ground (00:16:00). This recurrent image (so evocative of the
Paragone) reassures the viewer that the stories contained in those pages will not be lost:
the cinema will preserve them even when all the writings generated by the Resistance
have been destroyed. The final scene in the film, just before the fade-out, shows papers
blowing across the deserted street where Kula lies murdered (01:35:59). While Stawinski
tells his story as a fictionalised account in order to demonstrate the horrors of World War
Two, these constant reminders of the written word in the film demonstrate Wajda’s
concern with telling the truth and sending the message to the world through the film.
While Wajda wanted to present the entire truth, he was not able to represent the
Soviet betrayal of the Home Army. The repeated images of papers being tossed around
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also remind the viewer that not everything can be gathered together: a completely
accurate record of events is not possible. As Falkowska explains:
The Soviets were expected to aid the Polish insurgents, but instead waited
patiently on the other side of the Vistula until the city of Warszawa bled to
death. O f course, Wajda could allude only metonymically to the Soviet
betrayal: “I could not show that Soviet troops were waiting on the other side
of the Vistula River while the Warszawa insurrection died on this side. It was
enough that I lead the protagonists of my film to the canal’s outlet, from
which they could see the other side of the river.” (48-9)
While Korab and Stokrotka cannot get to the other side of the Vistula River, the despair
of this moment is replaced with hope when Wajda uses this scene as an allusion to the
Soviet betrayal. The message of what happened during the insurrection is still delivered
in the film, regardless of the protagonists being unable to escape the horrible sewers.
Korab and Stokrotka manage to make it on their own to the end of the tunnel, and while
they are locked in, their final look out serves as a sign of their ultimate resistance to the
German takeover.
Perhaps when directing this final scene, Wajda had Virgil’s final instructions to
Dante in mind. Having passed through the flames on the Cornice of Lust, Dante is told
that he no longer needs his beloved guide; that his will is strong; and that he can be
guided by his own purified desires. Here are Virgil’s final words to him:
lo tuo piacere omai prendi per duce;
fuor se’ de 1’erte vie, fuor se’ de 1’arte.
Vedi lo sol c h e ’n fronte ti riluce;
vedi l’erbetta, i fiori e li arbuscelli
che qui la terra sol da se produce.
Mentre che vegnan lieti li occhi belli
che, lagrimando, a te venir mi fenno,
seder ti puoi e puoi andar tra elli.
Non aspettar mio dir piu ne mio cenno;
libero, dritto e sano e tuo arbitrio,

i
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e fallo fora non fare a suo senno:
per ch’io te sovra te corono e mitrio.”
[From now on take your pleasure as your guide.
You are free o f the steep way, free of the narrow.
‘Look at the sun shining before you,
Look at the fresh grasses, flowers, and trees
which here the earth produces of itself. '
‘You may sit down or move among these
until the fair eyes come, rejoicing,
which weeping bid me come to you.
‘No longer wait for word or sign from me.
Your will is free, upright, and sound.
Not to act as it chooses is unworthy:
over yourself I crown and miter you.’] (Purg. 27.131-42)
Like Dante at this culminating moment, Stokrotka and Korab no longer have to struggle
along any path but can rest to look at “lo sol che ’n fronte ti riluce” and at “l’erbette, i
fiori e li arbuscelli / che qui la terra sol da se produce.” This glance at the sky also
anticipates the moment in the film when Halinka kills herself and the camera zooms in on
her face, her eyes looking peacefully upwards. Korab and Stokrotka fight until the very
end to escape the Ghetto and arrive at the exact point where they can best express their
dauntless will to continue fighting the Germans. As the film draws to a close, Wajda
suggests that the hope of the heights remains through the continual struggle against the
German oppressors. Just as Dante is able to continue his pilgrimage, the Resistance
members (even in defeat) carry on their resistance to the Nazis. Stokrotka, Korab, Zadra
and Halinka never waver in their quest for freedom or relinquish their hope of escape.
They raise themselves morally above their infernal situation. While the descent into the
sewers initially recalls Dante’s descent in Hell, the undaunted will of the Resistance to
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CHAPTER THREE
Provisional Investigations: Peter Weiss’s D/e Er mittlung and Dante’s Paradiso

Die Ermittlung is a condensed dramatization of the lengthy transcripts generated
by the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials, which ran from December 10,1963 to August 10,
1965. The play premiered in Berlin on October 19,1965 under the slyly ambiguous
German title Die Ermittlung. Immediately controversial, it was Peter Weiss’s sixth work
for the stage.,As the silent Ermittler behind the scenes, working either as a humble
“investigator/detective” who dutifully uncovers the facts about Auschwitz in a forensic :
sense or as a more exalted “ascertainer/determiner” who tries to settle the profoundly
disturbing questions raised by the case in an ethical or theological sense, Weiss all but
effaced himself as a playwright. Though he had only just recently sprung to international
fame with his fourth play, the garrulously playwright-centred Marat/Sade (1963), his
authorial role in Die Ermittlung recalls the critically detached function of a municipal
archivist or a documentary filmmaker. By subtitling the play Oratorium in 11 Gesangen
(“Oratorio in 11 Cantos”) he further slyly distanced himself from the stage by implicitly
representing himself as a lyrical poet, an obscure librettist who had supplied the text for a
vast and wholly imaginary choral work on sacred themes. If “Oratorio” harks back to the
masterpieces of Handel and Bach, “Cantos” inevitably conjures up the poetic genius of
Dante. Even as the awkward prime number eleven recalls Dante’s triumphantly perfect
one hundred cantos, it also ironically suggests that Weiss had only been able to supply a :
small imperfect fragment of a woefully modem Commedia.
Dante’s Commedia had certainly been on Weiss’s mind as he.contemplated the
cultural aftermath of Auschwitz. He had originally conceived Die Ermittlung as a
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surrealist dialogue between Dante and Giotto, whose shades would have been
“discovered” walking through the death-camp intent on making allegorical sense of what
they saw around them (Rolleston 8). Would their medieval glosses on Auschwitz have
defamiliarized the deadeningly familiar facts attested by the witnesses in the trials, the
horrors o f the Holocaust serving as signs o f the Sadean atheism at the infernal core of
Modernity? Or would their Catholic (and inevitably tropological) investigation of the
camp have simply revealed the absurdity of reading the terrible minutiae of the Holocaust
sub specie aeternitatisl We shall never know, since Weiss decided to abandon Dante and
Giotto as characters in favour of various actual participants in the trials. Several hundred:
witnesses were narrowed down to a representative nine, while eighteen of the original
twenty defendants filled out the dramatis personae along with one attorney for the
defence, one for the prosecution, and one judge.
As scattered references in his notes and essays attest, Weiss turned to Paradiso
rather than to Inferno as the poetic model for structuring the polyphonic “cantos” of his
investigation. Counterintuitive as this intertextual move may seem, it was hardly
arbitrary. As Robert Cohen has argued, Hell was for Weiss “the place of the powerful,
the rulers, the exploiters, the repressors, and the torturers”, while Purgatory was “the
place of contemporary battles...of doubts and contradictions” and Paradise “the place of
the victims, ‘the blessed...who are still waiting for their liberation’” (79). Clearly siding
with the witnesses at the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials, Weiss projected onto them the :
vigilant role of Dante’s Blessed. Not only the martyrs but all the saints in Paradiso look
down on the World as its “victims” from a Boethian perspective: their liberation from the
coils of history will not be complete until Fortune’s wheel stops turning at the end of
time. As long as the saints feel compassion for sinners and intervene on their behalf, as
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Lucy and Beatrice have done for Dante, even the most contemplative of the Heavenly
Host will be intensely engaged with the World as moral “investigators” forever primed to
become what we would now call “activists” for social justice.
Weiss personally attended the trials and published his investigation as a script
while the judge was still hearing testimony. As a production, Die Ermittlung opened a
little over two months after the final verdicts had been read. By concealing this
background information from the audience and by omitting the sentencing phase of the
trials, Weiss strategically foregrounded the victimized witnesses and drew attention away
from the infernal “repressors” and “torturers” who had hitherto been spotlit by sensational
media accounts of der Auschwitz-Prozess. In so far as the witnesses offer their testimony
in hopes of liberation from the injustice delivered to them in Auschwitz, Die Ermittlung is
dramatically aligned with the politics of collective intervention and hierarchical
subversion radically proposed by Dante’s intercessors in Paradiso.
Despite Weiss’s explicit remarks on the genesis of Die Ermittlung, critics have
had a hard time accepting his choice of Paradiso as the model for the play.
Bosmajian, for instance, prefers to read Inferno into it:

Hamida
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Structurally, The Investigation is akin to the Inferno in its division of thirtythree cantos subdivided by eleven subjects. The thirty-fourth canto of the
Inferno is not needed, aside from the numerical balance, because the previous
life of the inmates is not of interest. Any wrong they may have committed is
irrelevant to their imprisonment. A further parallel with the Inferno is the
movement of the oratorium from the periphery o f the ramp to the center of
destruction, the fiery ovens where the person was totally obliterated. In the
icy circles of Caina, the damned were forever frozen in their individuality, but
in Auschwitz those designated as damned simply vanished. (172)

12 Critics have tended to forget our at least to ignore W eiss’s authorship o f a play entitled Inferno (1964).
He clearly regarded Die Ermittlung as a separate endeavour from the usual Modernist project o f rewriting
Dante’s Inferno.
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While correctly noting that Die Ermittlung has thirty-three sections comparable to the
canto divisions of the descending journey in Inferno—minus the smarrimento canto—
Bosmajian oddly ignores the two subsequent cantiche in which a thirty-fourth canto does
not need to be explained away. If “the previous life of the inmates is not of interest,” as
she claims, why does Weiss focus on the testimony of witnesses who must look back
almost twenty years for the time of their victimization in Auschwitz? Equally puzzling is
the analogy she draws between Caina and the Auschwitz crematoria. Surely no two final
destinations could be more dissimilar than the frozen lake of the Ninth Circle where
guilty souls are forever preserved and the fiery ovens of the death camp where innocent
victims were once “totally obliterated.”
Sensing a Dantean design behind the cyclical repetition of experiences recalled by
the witnesses in the play, Bosmajian goes on to argue that in “the final three cantos about
the fiery ovens, Die Ermittlung returns to the ramp, the beginning of the victims’
experience which was repeated so many times in the history o f the camps” (180). Does
Dante return to the beginning of his journey at the end of Inferno? No, it is at the end of
Paradiso that he whirls back to earth to gather his memories like Sybil’s leaves into the
grand cyclical design of the Sacred Poem. Like Dante, Weiss’s witnesses return from a
difficult journey and are bravely impelled to tell about it. Consider for instance the
testimony o f the second witness. While answering a question about his transfer to the
main camp at Auschwitz, he notes that he almost did not get out of the camp because he
did not have his pass with him (Weiss 123). Dante is only able to return after he passes
the tests the saints demand of him so that he can stand before the Divine Judge in the
Empyrean without fear o f death or damnation. Similarly Weiss’s witnesses must face a
judge before they can escape the despair of the death camp again—this time as a
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Reflecting on the mimetic rationale for the contrapasso within Dante’s
representation o f the divine justice system, Anthony K. Cassell observes that “from
the descent into Hell, through the Exodus of the ascent and purgation of the second
realm, to the promised land of Heaven, the Wayfarer’s journey is indeed made
allegorically in imitation o f Christ’s baptism, ‘to fulfil all justice’” (13). If the
promise of justice is thunderously affirmed anywhere to Dante’s universe, it is in
Paradise; mere echoes of that affirmation are heard in Hell and Purgatory. The
victims of the crematoria, then, are identified in Die Ermittlung with the blessed
justice-seekers in Paradiso. Like the saints at the Last Judgment, the witnesses at
the Frankfurt trials do not waver in their faith that justice will ultimately prevail in
condemning the perpetrators of the Holocaust.

-

A Dantean reading of the elaborate dispositio o f the play has also been proposed
by Erika Salloch, who provides the following rationale for Weiss’s structural use of the
numbers eleven and thirty-three:
Dante uses this structure to symbolize the harmonious, symmetrical world
system which God has created (the prologue to the “Inferno” raises the total
number of cantos to the mystical figure 100). Weiss mixes this harmonic
scheme with the indivisible 11. He could not have kept the harmonious
scheme of the Divina Commedia, because the play, The Investigation, is
open-ended without solution. (5)
In contrast to Bosmajian, Salloch reads the structure of the play as an unsettling
conflation of infernal irregularity and paradisial symmetry. The awkward indivisibility of
eleven clashes with the theologically irresistible divisibility o f thirty-three: a discord left
unresolved by the open-endedness of the play. “The region o f Purgatorio,” she
convincingly argues, “is not a part of The Investigation because it has ‘motion, the
thought of change’ (Voriibung, p. 137), reflecting Dante’s description of Purgatorio, in
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which the soul o f man can purge its guilt and grow worthy” (3). While the witnesses
speak out against the criminal actions o f the defendants in the camps, the defendants’
actions in the play do not suggest that they are interested in purging guilt or even
admitting it. Instead, after the defendants hear or answer an accusation, they frequently
laugh together at the words spoken against them. Since the past cannot be changed, the
defendants have no way to progress in a purgatorial sense without accepting or admitting
their guilt.
Moving against the interpretive current initiated by Bosmajian and Salloch in the
1970s, Fabian Lampart has recently striven to read Die Ermittlung as a Modernist
Paradiso in accordance with Weiss’s statements of authorial intent. The third cantica
pervades the play, he argues, because o f Weiss’s effort “to establish-the topography of the
Divina Commedia in a historical present” (294). In the historical present of the
i

dramatized trials, “Paradise becomes the place where sinners and victims live together”
(294). In sharp contrast of Dante’s Inferno, which casts us down into a private theatre of
cruelty, Weiss’s Paradiso opens up for us a public forum where “it is possible to tell the
truth about the culprits, to find the words with which their crimes can be marked” (294).
Early in the trial, Defendant Fifteen notes that he has developed health problems from
dealing with the stress of having to account for his actions at Auschwitz:
Your Honour
all I would really like to do here
is make a clean breast of everything
It has been troubling me deeply for years
I have developed heart trouble
from all the worry
And then they have to foul up the last years of my life
with this whole stinking mess [.] (Weiss 131)

-
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After denying his responsibility for the death o f any inmate in Auschwitz, he petulantly
expresses a wish to confess his sins but then rears back and blames the witnesses for his
“heart trouble / from all the worry.” The judge responds sarcastically to the defendant’s
mention o f “this whole stinking mess” by refusing to suppose that he is referring “to the
proceedings / instituted by the prosecution” (131). Since the defendant is only acting the
part of a penitent sinner, the judge clearly wishes to expose the insincerity of his
confession and sternly points out that the trial in which Defendant Fifteen is involved is to
be taken seriously. Here Weiss makes sure that the defendant exposes his own guilt
through his mockery of confession.
The humiliating exposure of the guilty is the primary function of the contrapasso
in the Dantean justice system, and it often takes the form of a parodic re-enactment of
their guilt-inducing deeds. According to Cassell, we as readers
satisfy our quest to understand the contrapasso in the Inferno when we see
not only that the ‘punishment fits the crime’ but that it is, in all cases, more
profoundly, a strict manifestation of the sin as guilt. By tracing the
underlying patristic concepts, we can understand that the suffering represents
an exteriorizing of the wickedness and corruption that lurks within the souls
o f the sinners. (9)
Unfortunately the defendants in the play seem unable to feel any guilt even when they go
through the motions of confession. Just as Dante’s readers must strive to recognize what
the Damned are forced to expose in their punishments, so Weiss’s audience must detect
the notes o f self-accusation in the defendants’ self-excusing testimony. Continuing his
discussion of guilt, Cassell notes how Dante’s Damned are “punished by becoming
unchangeable in their iniquity; the disorder of their wills, responsible for their damnation,
remains in them throughout eternity; for them goodness is no longer possible” (9).
Whereas the wills o f the Purgatorians strain to return to God, the Damned resist this
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natural impulse because they are trapped within their guilt-ridden egos. By denying their
culpability, the Nazis remain similarly “unchangeable in their iniquity.”
The plea for justice resounds throughout Paradiso. In the Heaven of Jupiter, for
instance, Dante urges all the just souls forming the celestial Eagle to pray for the sinners
on earth, so that they may acknowledge their guilt and contritely renounce the bad
examples they have followed:
O milizia del d e l cu’ io contemplo,
adora per color che sono in terra
tutti sviati dietro al malo essemplo!
Già si solea con le spade far guerra;
ma or si fa togliendo or qui or quivi
lo pan che T pio Padre a nessun serra.
[O soldiery of Heaven, whom I contemplate,
pray for those still on the earth,
those led astray by bad example!

,-

It was the custom once to go to war with swords.
Now wars are fought withholding here and there
the bread our loving Father keeps from none.] {Par. 18.124-9)
If the Nazi regime is taken as the modem paradigm of the “maio essemplo,” then this
Dantean prayer resonates with Weiss’s urgent plea on behalf of all the victims—a plea
intensified by the cumulative testimony of the witnesses—that the defendants
acknowledge their guilt and experience true penitence. Dante-poet “tells the truth about
the culprits” when he prays for the sinners who steal bread and fight dishonourably. Only
when Dante-pilgrim is presented with the “milizia del ciel” is he able to utter this prayer,
and only in Paradiso can he find this “milizia.” Similarly, Weiss constructs a collective
prayer for justice out o f the diverse truths told about the Nazi oppressors by the survivors
of Auschwitz who, like the heavenly militia, refuse to be daunted by the earthly spectacle
of justice denied and justice perverted.
(.
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Following Salloch’s argument that Weiss’s comprehension of the Commedia
causes a conflation of Inferno and Paradiso, Lampart notes that “the topographic
organisation of the drama combines the structure of Dante’s Inferno with that of the
Paradiso, according to W eiss’s conviction that in a post-Holocaust world even in heaven,
redemption cannot be found. With this topographic framework, the drama attempts to
give a contemporary response to the language o f Dante” (295). But does Weiss
ultimately succumb to the Modernist temptation (rooted in Blake and ritualized by Pound)
to marry Heaven and Hell? From the strict perspective of Dantean tropology, Paradise
cannot be collapsed into the Inferno without a total loss of the Truth. This conflation may
be imagined as an allegory of the poets, a mere fiction. But it cannot be sustained as a
truth-telling allegory of the theologians. Weiss is not prepared to abandon the Truth
either as a dramatic goal or as a theological concept. While the defendants mock the
witnesses, the witnesses are still able to speak out against their mockers; they are still able
to speak Truth (their version of it at least) to Power. Consequently, Weiss is not
concerned with the earthly verdicts; he does not include the sentencing in the play or
criticize the outcomes of der Auschwitz-Prozess as too soft. In the end the defendants are
left waiting for God’s— or the audience’s—verdict on their crimes.
If we are not to wait for the judge’s verdict at the play, then what is the point of
W eiss’s investigation of justice in Die Ermittlung? Here is Tammis Thomas’s cogent
answer to this question:
Although Weiss includes brief speaking parts for judges, prosecutors, defence
attorneys, and outside witnesses, the play unfolds as an uneven dialectic of
victim assertions and perpetrator denials. On the most obvious level the
perpetrators’ adamant expressions of denial represent attempts by the
perpetrators and the larger post-war German culture to deny the crimes of the
Nazi past. The strength of the perpetrators’ continuously adamant denials in
response to the relative weakness of the victims’ testimonial narratives has
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also been interpreted as an attempt by the defendants in the courtroom to
reproduce the dynamics of persecution created by the perpetrators in the
camp. (578)
Thomas is correct to point out that the defendants’ “adamant expressions of denial” seem
to weaken the witnesses’ statements. The defendants outnumber the witnesses two to one
in Die Ermittlung, thus making the defendants seem to have more vocal support than their
accusers. However, the witnesses are given much more time to speak than the
defendants. A statistical analysis o f the allocation of lines to characters in the play
confirms that the witnesses are given thirty-six percent of the speeches and the judge
thirty-two percent. The defendants, prosecutors, and defence attorneys are given sixteen
percent, ten percent, and six percent respectively. In condensing the trial into the play,
Weiss has ensured that the witnesses and the judge, while outnumbered by the
defendants, deliver sixty-eight percent o f the dialogue. Their order in the sequence of
speakers also gives them prominence in comparison with the defendants. The judge
speaks first in the play; then five of the nine witnesses give testimony; the four remaining
witnesses speak out before the end o f the first canto. The speeches of the attorneys and
the eighteen defendants are then distributed throughout the rest of the play. In Weiss’s
adaptation of the transcripts, the witnesses are more often questioned by the judge than by
the attorneys. In one instance, the seventh witness claims to have seen the defendants
Stark, Hofmann, Kaduk and Baretzki at the crematoria and the counsel for the defence
interrupts the witness’s testimony to call attention to the fact that these defendants deny
their participation. The judge chooses to ignore the interruption from the counsel for the
defence and asks the witness to continue his account of the events (Weiss 280). The
judge is concerned with hearing what the witnesses have to say, not the denials of the
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defence. Clearly choosing not to participate in Holocaust-denial, Weiss has striven
instead to let the truth be spoken without interruption.
According to Cassell, the judicial goal of the Commedia “is to remove those living
in this life from a state o f misery and to bring them to a state of happiness” (5). Weiss’s
specific concern for the victims is ethically in tune with Dante’s general concern for
everyone “living in this life.” In both cases the desire of the writer is to turn misery into
happiness, which is not likely to happen on earth but will be a perpetual outcome of
justice in Heaven. In sharp contrast to the Damned, whose misery in the Inferno is a
direct consequence of their failure to align their individual wills with the Divine Will, the
victims of the Holocaust did not deserve their misery and no exercise of their wills, either individually or collectively, could have saved them from their doorm
Another reason for doubting that Weiss’s intent in the play was to conflate Inferno
with Paradiso has been suggested by David L. Pike, who points out that hope all but
flickers out in the first cantica only to blaze forth like a newly created star in the third.
Weiss’s Paradiso is “Dante’s recapitulation of Inferno as the story of the victims, with
hope always in the background” (90). This redemptive reading is at odds with Lampart’s
conclusion that Weiss does not believe in redemption at all. For the defendants no earthly
punishment may ever truly fit their crimes, but for the witnesses the judicial process itself
has revived and sustained hope that the truth of their words will be heard and the guilt of
the defendants proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Dante’s great-great-grandfather
Cacciaguida can also look back on a tumultuous past with a steady moral gaze and not
fall into the trap of despair. Felled as a Crusader, he describes his violent death to Dante
with Boethian equanimity:
“Quivi fu’ io da quella gente turpa
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disviluppato dal mondo fallace,
lo cui amor molt’anime deturpa;
e venni dal martiro a questa pace.”
[‘There was I freed by that foul race
from all the snares of the deceitful world—
the love of which corrupts so many souls— . :
and came from being martyred to this peace.’] {Par. 15.145-8)
While the Infidels who killed him must continue their unholy war against God in the
lower circles of the Inferno, he has escaped not only their “foul race” but also their eternal
restlessness. He is now at peace. If Die Ermittlung truly mirrors Paradiso, then
Cacciaguida’s experience of “pace” as a blessed release from the murderous rage (if not
the memory) of war must also be a state that the witnesses at the trial may devoutly hope
to attain. If Die Ermittlung were to mirror Inferno, then there would be no hope for the
witnesses. The words of the witnesses would not matter; only the testimony o f the
defendants would “count” (in an allegorical sense) as evidence of the godless battlefield
on which humanity now finds itself. According to Cassell, Dante’s God judges the
Damned in order to sustain the hopes of the penitent in the moral order of the universe.
The design o f the Commedia accordingly
reflects the form of justice which, as Dante believed, obtained before the
Coming of Christ who made possible man’s reconciliation with heavenly
grace and mercy through faith, hope, and the love of God and neighbour.
Those who reject these virtues are fittingly condemned to dwell forever in a
realm where Christ’s merciful New Dispensation and Law hold no place. (3)
The Dantean design of the play reveals that the defendants live without faith or hope,
having abandoned their love of God and neighbour. Though the victims were persecuted
for their faith and their love of God, they suffered to hold onto hope even in the darkest
days of the camps. From Weiss’s Cacciaguidan viewpoint the Jewish survivors of
Auschwitz are the new martyrs who deserve some kind of redemption—if not a Christian
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one based on Christ’s merciful New Dispensation, then perhaps a surrogate deliverance
provided by the investigative powers o f the theatre.
Might Paradiso have also provided Weiss with a rhetorical model for the
articulation of difficult truths about the inhumanity unleashed by human history?
Definitely, contends Katja Garloff in her reading of Weiss’s notes:
. . . topographical precision and a factual, detailed language were to mark the
witnesses’ discourse. “The Investigation {Paradiso)— asks with extreme
exactness about every single detail, again and again—Did they come from the
right? Where was the door? What did it look like? (Nb, 282); “above all in
Paradiso: very simple, short sentences; extreme austerity; crucial, concrete
details” (Nb, 255). Another note reinforces the idea that heaven and hell were
to represent two different discursive spaces, allowing for two different modes
of speech: lies, evasions, and rationalizations in hell, contrasted with clear
exactness in heaven (Nb, 216). Given that Weiss intended to rewrite Dante’s Divine Comedy from a radically secular perspective, rejecting the possibility
of otherworldly compensation for earthly suffering, it seems consistent that
the victims’ testimonies figure as the sole substitute for paradisiacal
redemption. (91)
Weiss recognizes that factual narration can be trusted in Paradiso, but not in Inferno.
Cassell makes a similar observation, noting that Dante’s education in Hell contrasts
sharply with what (and how) he learns in Purgatory and Paradise:
. . . the Wayfarer falls into error through his own mistaken conceptions, and,
while in Paradise, his misconceptions are directly corrected by heavenly
teachers, only in Hell is he led intentionally into error by lying demons and
shades. (14)
The defendants’ constant denials and the defence counsel’s efforts to confuse the
witnesses make the jury’s education difficult to comprehend. While the trial does not
provide any “heavenly teachers,” the witnesses are sure of their statements and speak as
concisely and correctly as possible. They also speak clearly, without harsh accusations
towards the defendants, just as Cacciaguida softens his accusations of the “gente turpa”
who killed him, choosing to celebrate his liberation from earth instead. The “lies,
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evasions, and rationalizations” that belong in Hell can be seen in an exchange between
the eighth witness and the counsel for the defence. When the eighth witness refers to the
Boger swing, the counsel for the defence states that the witness himself survived the
swing and therefore “it was possible / to survive it after all” (Weiss 171). The witness
had stated earlier that the swing meant death. By taking the words of the witness quite
literally, in an absolute sense, the counsel for the defence tries to undermine the authority
of the witness through a sophistic process o f rationalization. Hell is the place where harsh
accusations are heard and words are twisted to suit cruel means. Sophistry is condemned
in Paradise {Par. 11.1 -3).
Garloff, however, is incorrect to think that Weiss rejects “otherworldly
compensation for earthly suffering.” When the second witness is speaking, the counsel
for the defence feels the need to state that “this witness has already/served his
sentence/and he cannot be tried here again” (249). The witness feels compelled to
respond, explaining that he still considers himself innocent despite his sentencing. Even
this witness, who has previously been identified as a perpetrator, is unable to admit guilt.
\

While earthly justice prevents him from being retried for his crimes in Auschwitz, hope
remains that any justice left undone will be accomplished later through the truthful
testimony o f the witnesses in the play. The second witness may speak the truth but has
not yet answered for his actions. The play effectively condemns him because the court
has failed to do so.
While Weiss may hope for “otherworldly compensation for earthly suffering,” he
does not rely on that concept and wants the reader to understand that the witnesses speak
the truth. Regardless of how difficult the facts may be to hear, they are part of the

i,
world’s history. Cohen explains that
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to come to an understanding of Weiss’s play, the reader or spectator also has
to abandon the belief that the world of concentration camps remains
incomprehensible. What happened in Auschwitz needs to be placed in a
historic continuum whose roots can be traced in history and which, in a
different form, might conceivably happen again. (95)
Weiss writes the play in hopes that the readers and spectators recognize that without
diligence the events in Auschwitz “might conceivably happen again.” The witnesses
even struggle in Die Ermittlung not to fall into the role o f disbeliever when asked about
events in the camps. The first witness is unable to believe the rumour that the inmates he
saw being shipped through his rail yard were destined for extermination (Weiss 121).
The witness’s presence at the trial, however, is a statement of the possibility o f the
extermination. If the rumours could not have been substantiated, then the trial would not be possible since there would be no criminals to prosecute. !
Like Dante in the opening tercets of Paradiso, Weiss is deeply concerned with the
unreliability of memory to establish the facts about an extraordinary set of experiences.
Yet his play sets out to investigate the facts about Auschwitz twenty years after the war
and to champion a group of witnesses who may not be able to remember all the traumatic
details of their incarceration. C. W. E. Bigsby, however, explains that “Peter Weiss chose
to give prominence not to documents but to the testimony o f those who had been in the
camps, as guards and prisoners. If the past is preserved in documents, albeit documents
provided by those who might be thought to have motives for distorting them, then it is
preserved in another sense by the memories of those who were present” (152). While the
memories may be imperfect, they preserve the events without the “motives for distorting
them.” The witnesses speak from what they believe is the heart of their truth— even if
their memories have failed to capture every moment in Auschwitz. If the witnesses are
not telling lies, then their testimony preserves some part of the history of Auschwitz. The
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hazy boundary between lying and truth-telling is examined by Beatrice on the verge of
Dante’s dreamlike ascent to the Tenth Heaven:
sì che là giù, non dormendo, si sogna,
credendo e non credendo dicer vero;
ma ne l’uno è più colpa e più vergogna.

;^

[‘Thus down there men are dreaming while they wake,
believing that they speak the truth. And those
who don’t believe so share the greater guilt and shame.] (Par. 29.82-4)
While those men who “credendo e non credendo” are to blame for spreading lies, the ones
who do not believe share “più colpa e più vergogna.” The defendants constantly try to
deny their knowledge o f the events, saying that they could not believe what was being
said about Auschwitz; even those defendants who had direct contact with the prisoners
seem to report this. The witnesses, however, even while testifying to things that occurred
in a slightly different manner, believe they are speaking the truth and seek only to tell the
truth. Therefore, from a paradisial standpoint, even when their memories have distorted
the truths documented in their testimony, the witnesses have less “colpa” and less
“vergogna” than the defendants. The defendants knew that what was happening was not
correct but chose to ignore the facts and lie at the trial saying that they could not believe
what they heard because the rumours seemed impossible. Weiss surely recognized the
distorting power of disbelief in the Commedia, especially in Inferno. The reader of the
Inferno, “though tempted by the perverted ‘humanity’ o f the damned, [is] forced to
choose between the bewildering, often glossy, image of sin which they conjure up, and
the truth, the very justice of the contrapasso” (Cassell 14). While Dante confronts this
overwhelming contradiction in a poem about the afterlife, Weiss does not have access to
mystical experience and therefore uses the Auschwitz Trial to expose and condemn the
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same kind of infernal incomprehension and lack of empathy in the citizens of post-War
Germany.
Since Weiss is hoping for eternal justice and not the justice that may be found
during the trial, then the purpose of Die Ermittlung is not to identify how each of the
defendants received the appropriate punishment for their crimes. Bigsby suggests that the
“trial constituted one o f those moments in which a judicial process mattered less for its
ability to mediate between innocence and guilt than for its revelatory power” (159). The
facts of the trials, the testimony of the witnesses, the forced recollection of painful events
are what matter to Weiss as a playwright. The immediate political function o f his play is
to engage a wider public audience than the original courtroom observers in'the thrust a n d '
parry of der Auschwitz-Prozess. When asked whether he wanted topunish the audience
by lobbing the harsh words of the witnesses at them, he responded like a patient teacher
facing a difficult class o f sleepy or distracted students: “listen very carefully and be
completely awake, not hypnotized, absolutely alive, answering all the questions in the
play” (Gray 113). If he sounds here remarkably like Beatrice demanding total attention
from her easily overwhelmed student—
Apri la mente a quel ch’io ti paleso
e fermalvi entro; che non fa sci'enza
sanza lo ritenere, avere inteso . . .
[‘Open your mind to what I now explain
and fix it in your memory, for to hear
and not remember does not lead to knowledge . . . ] {Par. 5.40-2)
— we should not be surprised, given Weiss’s deep engagement with Dante-pilgrim’s
pedagogical process at the literal level o f Paradiso: Beatrice instructs Dante not only to
learn from what he hears but also to desire knowledge, to ask hard questions because he
yearns for profound understanding. In Paradiso, Dante has no time to float idly above
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the earth with an occasional disengaged glance back at the mad rout of history. Like the
saints he is constantly engaged with the moral conflicts of his age. Weiss is also asking
this of his audience. Whereas in Inferno Virgil instructs Dante to hurry along and not ask
too many; questions (Inf. 17.37-9), and in Purgatorio Belacqua demonstrates that physical
inaction does not mean he is not purging his sins (Purg. 4.127-9), Dante’s main action in
Paradiso is acquiring knowledge through an investigative witnessing of what has hitherto
been hidden from most of humanity. Such is also the main action for the audience and
actors caught up in W eiss’s investigation of Auschwitz.
His avoidance o f the sentencing phase of the Prozess suggests another Dantean
motivation for writing the play. Just as Dante urges his readers to demand justice in the
Here and Now instead o f waiting for it in the Hereafter, so Weiss impels his audience to
investigate the trial system itself, to see how it can be radically improved to answer the
cries for justice from the witnesses. Perhaps this impulse turns Die Ermittlung into a
drama o f moral rehabilitation, a kind of social therapy. So thinks Bosmajian: “the hope
for an epiphany o f law and justice, the final cause of a trial, has faded and been largely
replaced by the therapeutic process of the trial as a demonstration or show aiming to raise
the consciousness and conscience of the world rather than of the criminal” (147). Such a
reading effectively turns the play into Weiss’s Purgatorio. If it truly is his Paradiso,
however, then something far more transfigurative and world-reforming must be going on
in it than a merely “therapeutic” restoration of sanity after the madness of Auschwitz. It
must promise the audience a new and inspiring vision o f justice operating in the world
even if the playwright can provide only a partial glimpse of that vision, an anticipatory
“ascertainment” o f it, as an illuminating impetus towards hope. Such a glimpse is all that
Dante-poet promises his readers in the opening tercets of Paradiso:
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La gloria di colui che tutto move
per l’universo penetra, e risplende
in una parte piu e meno altrove.
Nel ciel che piu de la sua luce prende
fu’ io, e vidi cose che ridire
ne sa ne puo chi di la su discende . . .
[The glory of Him who moves all things
pervades the universe and shines
in one part more and in another less.
I was in that heaven which receives
more o f His light. He who comes down from there
can neither know nor tell what he has seen . . . ] {Par. 1.1-6)
After ritually intoning the routine scholastic dictum that God’s glory pervades the
universe, the poet snaps us to attention with a surprising declaration that he has personally
experienced that glory in all its fullness but cannot—on his own—fell us about what he
cannot—on his own—know about it. That the third cantica flows from this admission of
failure “proves” that the Divine Source of the glory has illumined his mind and inspired
his words. His primary goal in Paradiso, then, is to raise the consciousness o f his readers
beyond the dense inglorious obstructions of the Fallen World so that the glorious
operation of the Divine Justice system can be visible to more than the saints who witness
it in the Empyrean.
While Weiss is not interested in unveiling the full glory of God to his audience, he
does share with Dante the activist goal of spreading not just the words of the witnesses
but their unshaken hope in the moral order o f the universe, in the prevailing of justice
through the world. For the playwright, as for the poet, this process is anything but a topdown fascistic imposition of homogenizing order on the unruly diversity of the world.
That was what the Nazis promised their adherents. Quite the reverse: it must be a just
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order that embraces human diversity. So the active (and activist) soul of Justinian
explains to Dante in the Heaven of Mercury:
addolcisce la viva giustizia
in noi l’affetto sì, che non si puote
torcer già mai ad alcuna nequizia.
Diverse voci fanno dolci note;
così diversi scanni in nostra vita
rendon dolce armonia tra queste rote.
[living justice sweetens our affection
we cannot ever then take on
the warp of wickedness.
‘Differing voices make sweet music.
Just so our differing ranks in this our life
create sweet harmony among these wheels.] {Par. 6.121-6)
The souls in Paradiso create “dolce armonia” because they celebrate-justice both
individually and collectively. Cassell has noted that Satan and his infernal empire
“separate the realm of Old Testament eye-for-an-eye justice from the purgatorial realm of
Grace and Justification” (104). Paradise is the perpetual synthesis of Church and Empire
under the rule o f Grace. For Weiss, however, “nequizia” is clearly evident in the
testimony o f the witnesses. The “diverse voci” who make “dolci note” in Paradise are
comparable to the witnesses because they are able to recount their diverse experiences of
injustice and moral failure (even Justinian recalls his lapse into heresy) without losing
hope in the ultimate triumph of justice over Satanic tyranny. Since Weiss mixes the
testimonies o f the witnesses together, he has already begun the harmonizing process.
While Justinian’s choristers, like all the saints in Paradiso, are unimpeded by doubt
in their celebration o f God’s justice, the witnesses in Die Ermittlung are still unsure that
justice will be served by the all-too-human process unfolding in the courtroom. Still
victimized by the Nazi atrocities committed two decades earlier, many of them “reflect on
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the possibilities and the limits of testimony in the case of witnesses who, in contrast to the
interviewed survivors, lack a sympathetic audience or, worse, who speak in front of a
decidedly unsympathetic audience” (Garloff 86). Justinian’s choristers do not have to
worry about a “decidedly unsympathetic audience” since all the Heavenly Host gladly
participate in the operations of God’s justice. They are all united by a common interest in
the fulfilment of the Divine Plan. By contrast, back on earth, caught up in the give-andtake o f a complicated legal process extended over a series of trials, Weiss has every
reason to worry that a reluctant (if not entirely unsympathetic) audience of secular
Germans who would prefer to put the War behind them will not allow for an objective
hearing of the victims’ painful testimonies. The saints themselves are keenly aware of
\ .

how difficult the achievement of objectivity is for mortal minds, as Thomas Aquinas
reminds Dante in the Heaven of the Sun:
perch’ elli ’ncontra che più volte piega
Toppimon corrente in falsa parte,
e poi l’affetto l’intelletto lega.
Vie più che ’ndamo da riva si parte,
perché non toma tal qual e’ si move,
chi pesca per lo vero e non ha l’arte.

N

[‘since it often happens that a hasty opinion
inclines one to the erring side, and then
fondness for it fetters the working o f the mind.
‘He who casts off from shore to fish for truth
without the necessary skill does not return the same
as he sets out, but worse, and all in vain.] {Par. 13.118-23)
Notice how Aquinas champions the disciplined use of the intellect in an ideally calm
process o f decision-making, contrasting it with an uncritical acceptance of “l’oppin'ion
corrente” which leads to hasty conclusions and inevitable errors of judgment. No doubt
this paradisial critique of undisciplined thinking haunted Weiss as he pondered what a
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trial ought to be: the rational analysis of objectively determined evidence leading through
due process to a just decision. Fallen human nature, Aquinas warns, is bound to pervert
this process. Should we abandon our vision of what the trial ought to be when its
historical unfolding fails to measure up to the ideal? Obviously not, Aquinas insists.
Perfect rationality has to be imagined before it can be enacted as a judicial process—tried
out, however tentatively—in the messy Here and Now.
For Weiss, “the invocation of Dante . . . was a reflection of that desire to imagine
salvation, albeit one denied by a seemingly resistant human nature” (Bigsby 174}. If
Dante can envision a realm where justice, objectivity, and rationality can coexist, even at
a time when human nature seemed especially resistant to them, then the witnesses in
Weiss’s play might also have a chance to imagine such a realm through the intercession
o f an impetuously hopeful author.
The critical investigation of easy answers and erroneous assumptions is a
recurrent action on the literal level of Paradiso. In the First Heaven, for instance,
Beatrice tests the limits of unaided human reason by asking Dante to explain the dark
spots on the Moon {Par. 2.52-8). Dante’s answer, based on the materialist assumptions of
natural philosophy, is tested and proved incorrect in light of Beatrice’s revelation about
the spiritual causes underlying material phenomena. Their exemplary pedagogical
interaction effectively demonstrates how answers to hard questions can be determined
with magisterial rationality and objectivity. At the start of Die Ermittlung, Weiss seeks to
engage the audience in just such an interaction:

;

This condensation [of the trial transcripts into the script for the play] should
contain nothing but facts. Personal experience and confrontations must give
way to anonymity. Inasmuch as the witnesses in the play lose their names,
they become mere anonymous voices. The nine witnesses sum up what
hundreds expressed. (Weiss 118)
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Since Beatrice is telepathically connected to the Divine Mind and thence to Aquinas and
all the other celestial intellects, her reasoning is perfectly consonant with the thought
processes that move the sun and the other stars. It is not really her reasoning at all but the
unified intellection of the Heavenly Host. Weiss moves towards this collectivity of
thought by making the nine witnesses speak “what hundreds expressed.”
By not naming the witnesses, Weiss casts them in the role of anonymous
representatives o f the many who saw the atrocities at Auschwitz but either did not survive
the camps or were too traumatized after liberation to speak out about their experiences.
Though the witnesses offer individual testimony, their presence in the play recalls that of
a chorus in Greek tragedy. Their function is to comment on a catastrophe by proclaiming
what happened off stage beyond the audience’s range of vision or knowledge. Only the
defendants are named in Die Ermittlung. They are named by the witnesses in their
testimony (Weiss 126). At the end of the play Weiss also provides a list of the defendants
by number and the trial or trials in which each was prosecuted (297-8). During the play,
however, it is up to the viewer (or reader) to remember which defendant is facing a
particular accusation from any one of the witnesses. The audience’s inevitable confusion
about the identity of the defendants strategically parallels the uncertainty of the witnesses
who struggle to identify the perpetrators years after they last saw them. The fifth witness
explains: “when I look at their faces / 1 find it hard to tell / whether I recognize them or
not / But that man there [Dr. Capesius] looks familiar to me” (126). After Dr. Capesius
denies being present at the selections, the sixth witness takes the stand and declares that
he had known Dr. Capesius in his hometown before the war (126). During crossexamination Dr. Capesius flatly denies knowing the sixth witness (127). For the
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witnesses who saw their oppressors every day during their time in Auschwitz, the denials
by the defendants must have been very frustrating, and Weiss clearly empathizes with
their frustration arid moves his audience to do so too by contrasting the cumulative
credibility of the witnesses’ testimony with the shifty self-apologetic retorts o f the
defendants.
As a witness to the society of the Blessed, Dante is occasionally frustrated by his
inability to recognize the faces o f individual souls or to remember their precise identities.
The third circle o f the Wise, for instance, flashes before his eyes and fades out before he
can identify a single soul sparkling in it (Par. 14.73-8). Despite these perceptual
failures— or rather because he owns up to them—his cumulative testimony has the ring of
truth about it. At least that’s what Dante-poet urges us to conclude from our empathy
with the pilgrim during his blackouts. Similarly Weiss urges us to trust the witnesses

.

because we can empathize with their struggle to recall faces and name names against the
overwhelming darkness of their experiences. Rewarded with beatific vision in the
Empyrean, Dante is finally able to see all the Blessed with superhuman acuity. It is his
reward for struggling patiently for so long to surmount his perceptual and intellectual
limitations in the quest for Truth. While Weiss cannot bestow beatific vision on his
audience, his alignment of the play with the third cantica deflects anger away from the
forgetful witnesses onto the defendants who deny their involvement in the Holocaust.
The paradisial promise of clarified vision encourages the investigators in their quest to
discover what truly happened at Auschwitz and what it ultimately means above and
beyond the painful muddle of the judicial process.
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Who has the last word in Die Ermittlungl Surprisingly, for all his empathy with
the witnesses and the victims, Weiss ends his play on a downbeat with a self-exonerating
homily delivered by Defendant One on the dismissively anodyne theme of “life goes on”:
All o f us
I want to make that very clear
did nothing but our duty
even when that duty was hard
and even when it grieved us to do it
Today
when our nation has worked its way up
after a devastating war
to a leading position in the world
we ought to concern ourselves
with other things [.] (296)
According to the stage directions, this speech is to be followed by “loud approbation from
the defendants” (296). Though Weiss is primarily concerned with the words o f the
witnesses as they struggle to establish the facts about Auschwitz, the long trial ironically
culminates in an absurd round of applause from the defendants: a signal not only of their
approval of the final speech but also of their mocking disdain for all the speeches of the
witnesses. Just as Dante-poet plunges the pilgrim back into the whorl of the Fallen World
at the end of Paradiso, so Weiss seems to cast himself (and his audience) back into the
normal workaday world of post-War Germany. Will a wilful ignorance, a strategic
failure of memory, bring the grand project of the investigation to a sorry end? Dante too
confronted a catastrophic loss of words and memories at the very moment of divine
union:
Da quinci innanzi il mio veder fu maggio
che T parlar mostra, ch’a tal vista cede,
e cede la memoria a tanto oltraggio.
[From that time on my power of sight exceeded
that o f speech, which fails at such a vision,
as memory fails at such abundance.] {Par. 33.55-7)
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-While the witnesses will not see justice done during the trial or their cause dramatically
advanced in the Hereafter by celestial ministers rallied by the Divine Judge, Weiss
nevertheless deploys his paradisial model for bathetic effect against the puffed-up
arrogance of Defendant One and his chortling claque. The end o f Paradiso is the
momentous beginning o f the Poem. If a momentous discourse about truth and justice
should surge forth from the open end o f Die Ermittlung, it could not be halted by the
sneering laughter o f the World or constrained within the narrow limits o f the Theatre.
Nevertheless, the elimination of sentencing from the play prevents the audience
from jumping to the hasty conclusion that all the defendants are equally villainous or
blameworthy. The investigation must go on— even as life must go on. According to
Jurgen Schlunk, “Weiss does not allow his readers to transfer the blame on the
executioners automatically; instead, he suggests that the arbitrary nature of the Nazi
system appointed some inmates to be prisoners and others to be guards, but that in
individual cases, it could just as well have been the other way around” (23). While the
dialogue in the play clearly distinguishes the witnesses from the defendants, Weiss
suggests that before the war started and Auschwitz was opened, the defendants could
easily have become the witnesses and vice versa. Reflecting on the ethical implications
o f his controversial decision to name the defendants but not the witnesses, he expresses
anxious concern that “the bearers of these names [the defendants] should not be accused
once again in this drama” (Weiss 119). If the defendants are not to be accused again, why
are they in the play at all? Perhaps their paradisial function is to serve as mouthpieces for
the peculiar mentality of the designers and perpetrators of Auschwitz. Their testimony is
a potential source of truth about the camp. As such, it cannot be simply dismissed or
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discounted. Dante’s saints often reflect on their moral failings and testify to the depraved
social or political conditions under which they lived. The roles of sinner and saint are
oddly reversible in some cases. Cunizza, for instance, finds herself among the saints in
the Third Heaven even though on earth she was a promiscuous adulteress raised in “la
terra prava” [the degenerate land] of Italy {Par. 9.25). Thanks to her miraculous
elevation to Paradise, she can now look back objectively on the depraved environment of
her sinful life. There but for the grace of God, indeed. Now there can be no confusing
interchangeability between the Saved and the Damned. If the witnesses and the
defendants were once confusingly interchangeable in the early days of the Third Reich,
they are so no longer. At least not from Weiss’s long-range paradisial perspective in Die
Ermittlung. While the defendants are free to damn themselves in the.play, they are not set
up as straw dogs for ritual attack. They are allowed to pass judgment on the witnesses
even as the witnesses testify to their depravity.
At several key moments in the play the witnesses struggle to explain how the rules
in Auschwitz made them both participants in and victims of the Nazi system of
destruction. According to the fifth witness,
It was normal
that everything had been stolen from us
It was normal
that we stole too . . .
And it was normal
that there were some among us
who helped those who stood over us
to beat us [.] (145)
Even the witnesses seem to understand that during their time in Auschwitz the normal
rules of right or wrong were suspended. Twenty years later, in the Frankfurt trials, they
continue to struggle with the disparity between the “normal” world of moral distinctions
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in which they now abide and that other world, the disordered realm of the camps. Like
Cacciaguida, who is only able to speak objectively about his own history from the
external vantage-point of Paradise, the witnesses also need distance—in space as well as
in time—to look back on their lives with objective equanimity and confront their forced
role in the persecution.
Weiss’s trumpeted emphasis on anonymity and factuality only underscores his
struggle to set himself at a distance from his own characters, to find some objective
position from which to judge their conformity to the evil order o f the camps. In a few
cases he changes the words of a witness, in order to remove any trace of guilt from the
testimony. During the actual trials, as Bosmajian discovered, one witness clearly recalled
how a Jewish prisoner had cooperated with one of the defendants, Kaduk, in the murder
of a fellow Jew:
“He told the second one, the Jew, to lie on his back. Kaduk placed the bloodspoiled iron across the neck and stood at one end. A prisoner had to stand at
the other. Thus the man was strangled.” Weiss omits the reference to the
other prisoner and thereby also omits the guilty relationship between
oppressors and oppressed. (174)
Though the fifth witness in the play concedes that it was common for a prisoner to act as
an abuser, Weiss downplays the twisted intimacy between the oppressed and their
oppressors— and the guilt arising from it—for the sake of drawing a clear moral line
between the witnesses and the defendants. It is a paradisial move on his part, a dramatic
transcendence o f the historical fact that the roles were often interchangeable. The third
witness even insists on distinguishing the different types of Nazis who were responsible
for killings in the camp:
Dr. Shatz and Dr. Frank. . .
did not kill out of hatred
or conviction

,
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They killed only because they had to
and it was hardly worth talking about
Only a few killed with passion [.] (Weiss 179)
The witnesses struggle to sustain such nice distinctions so that the public who did not
experience Auschwitz will come to understand their moral predicament. Yet if the
murder of one inmate “was hardly worth talking about,” why bother crying out for justice
after the execution o f millions? Weiss is unable to come up with a simple answer to this
overwhelming question, and since his investigation never becomes a full-fledged
theodicy, he simply passes over the problem o f guilt whenever the roles of witness and
defendant are blurred in the court records.
Perhaps a final answer to the question could only be supplied to his literary
imagination through the impassioned theodicy behind the allegorization of justice in
Paradiso. The human will is naturally inclined to rise to the heavens “though violence
may force it down a thousand times,” as Beatrice teaches Dante in her lecture on why
nuns who break their vows of chastity and obedience may still be deemed worthy of
sainthood {Par. 4.76-8). Just as the third witness notes that most Nazis did wrong out of a
misguided sense of duty, their wills having been forced down by the violence of an evil
system, so Beatrice would have Dante understand that the nuns in the First Heaven were
coerced into breaking their vows by the matrimonial pressures of the Italian class system.
The degree of guilt is therefore relative to the weakness or strength of an individual will,
and often that degree (so dependent on the psychological and social circumstances of the
wrongdoer) cannot be easily assessed from the external vantage-point of a human judge.
Die Ermittlung attempts to analyse what justice is and how much war criminals
feel twenty years after the war has finished, especially when memories begin to fade and
horrors become blurred by the passage of time. The Frankfurt trials sought to bring to
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light the different experiences of Auschwitz, without the same concern with justice as the
Nuremburg trails or the Eichmann trial. In the end, Weiss stuck by his decision not to use
his play to reaccuse the defendants or to make heroes out o f the witnesses. Die
Ermittlung is responsible for bringing the condensed words of hundreds of witnesses to
the attention of a large public and to make them aware of the failings of the judicial
system for something as large as the Holocaust. While the horrors of Auschwitz seem
only to apply to Inferno, the hope and objectivity found in Paradiso sustained Weiss’s
project o f investigating the Holocaust without drawing hasty conclusions about its cause
or facile lessons from its moral conundrums. Weiss relies on Dante’s representation of a
divinely sustained justice system in Paradiso to expose the failings of the German
judicial system and to suggest different ways in which the Auschwitz Trial can be viewed
as a provisional judgment on the defendants, even if their actual sentencing failed to
provide the apocalyptic satisfaction of a truly Dantean contrapasso.
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CONCLUSION
A Return from the Abyss

If Levi, Wajda, and Weiss share any narratological insight about the Holocaust, it
is an impassioned sense o f the survivors’ resistance to every predictable or permanent sort
of closure. Whether the Holocaust is represented as a Big Story to be punily denied or as
a dense skein o f conflicting tales in which fact and fiction cannot be easily distinguished
or truth simply affirmed, the compulsive desire to stop thinking and talking and writing
about it appears to be doomed to frustration by a commonly understood (though rarely
explicit) speech-act of defying the murderous silence that once enveloped the camps.
No talking cure can bring on a permanently therapeutic end-to personal obsessions
with the dehumanizing minutiae of camp life or to the guilt-ridden questions racked up
inside the minds of survivors, as Levi bleakly demonstrates in his memoir. He simply
breaks his story off, like a branch from an impossibly gnarly thorn-tree. The final
sentence o f Se Questo E un Uomo reads like a painful truncation despite its frail slivers of
hope: “Arthur ha raggiunto felicemente la sua famiglia, e Charles ha ripreso la sua
professione di maestro; ci siamo scambiati lunghe lettere e spero di poterlo ritrovare un
giomo” (Se Questo 153) [Arthur has reached his family happily and Charles has taken up
his teacher’s profession again; we have exchanged long letters and I hope to see him
again one day] (W oolf 173). A happy ending? Hardly. But neither is it a tragic
anagnorisis. Preceding this deceptively cheery, offhandedly domestic sign-off is a

'

bathetic description of the arrival of the Russian troops to Auschwitz with a clinical report
totting up who died and who survived with him in the hospital during the final ten days
before liberation. Any note of celebration in his voice is dampered by his uncertainty
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about seeing his friend Charles again or about re-entering the kind of normal social life
such a sentence would typically imply.
Like Levi, Wajda refuses to resolve his vision of foiled deliverance from the Nazi
death-machine into any kind of moral certainty about the resilience of the Human Spirit
or the vanity o f Human Wishes. Instead of closing in on a religious symbol of salvation,
a church steeple off in the distance, say, or a political sign o f gathering Polish strength
such as a dauntless band o f reinforcements marching forth to aid the weary fighters in the
Uprising, the final moments of Kanal provoke only broodingly ironic meditations on the
capture of the resistance fighters, the descent of Zadra back into the sewers, and the
hapless solidity o f the lovers as the filthy stream they have been following mocks their
entrapment by flowing freely through the iron gate. Though Wajda-hoped that his
narrative o f escape from Warsaw would inspire Poland to recover its long-lost sense of
national unity, his film ends on a purgatorial downbeat after a series of seemingly
irrevocable calamities that scatter, overwhelm, and eventually annihilate the band of
never-quite-heroic fugitives.
No voice from the Holocaust sounds more frustrated by the intractable
contentiousness of its aftermath than Defendant One’s rasping exhalation at the end of
Weiss’s Die Ermittlung. “These recriminations / should have fallen / under the Statute of
Limitations / a long time ago,” he bitterly complains (296), but no neat legal stratagem for
putting an end to the trials once and for all is provided either by the courts or by the
theatre. Weiss even denies his audience the satisfaction of a climactic sense of
sentencing, however strictly it was required or vindictively expected at the end of the
actual trials. The highly regulated ritual of charging and testifying in the dramatized
Auschwitz-Prozess is rudely interrupted by “loud approbation” from the defendants—a
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disruption o f the order o f the court—which strangely pre-empts (even as it stridently
prompts) the audience’s impulse to honour the age-old theatrical ritual of applauding the
players at the end of their performance. When even ritual endings fail to bring the relief
o f closure, Weiss suggests, what we may be facing in the long run is the perplexing
possibility that the Holocaust is not an open-ended story at all but an unendable or neverending one.

‘

It is a possibility anticipated by Dante at the alpha-and-omega ending o f the
Commedia. At the omega point in the third cantica, the pilgrim achieves his long-term
goal of divine union with its surprise coda, the inspirational reprise of the Spiration in the
transfer of the grand “forma” of the Poem onto the receptive “materia” in the Poet’s mind.
But this ultimate climax is also the alpha point in the generation of the Commedia: its
potential for reforming the world can only be realized when the Poet returns to his
temporal consciousness in the Dark Wood (again) and begins to retrace his steps back to
God. The retracing is helicoidal rather than strictly circular since each return to God is a
unique experience, just as each reading and rereading of the Poem brings fresh
understandings o f its universalizing design. As long as the sun and the other stars whirl
out the cycles of time, the regenerative impact of the Poem on the world will be neverending in accordance with the Divine Plan. And since its Formal Cause is the allencompassing circle of the Divine Mind itself, the operations of the Poem are ultimately
eternal and therefore unendable. That’s the paradisial way of interpreting Dante’s double
closure, his twinning of anagogy and catagogy in the high fantasy of poetic
cosmogenesis.
It may also be read, of course, in an infernal way. The Poet’s bewildering loss of
the Divine Presence, the sudden inversion of his moral bearings as his soul plunges back
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into the thickets of fraud and wrath and greed, is an experience never truly to be
transcended in the Poem but only escaped for a while. How much darker and more
savage will the “cammino alto e silestro” [deep and savage way] {Par. 2.142) seem to a
pilgrim-reader who already knows what it leads to! And surely the savage darkness will
only intensify with every return o f the wayward soul to the menacing start of the
smarrimento. Here the unendable route with its never-ending torments takes on the
menace o f a recurrent nightmare or an obsessive memory-lurch back to the site of
unspeakable trauma. The only “Statue of Limitations” that can stop the compulsive
energy of the Poem’s vicious circling is the cessation of history at the crack of Doom.
History, in the meantime, is ruining down into the depths of perdition.
If Levi, Wajda, or Weiss looked back to Dante for guidance in ending their
narratives o f the Holocaust, they most likely drew some ironic inspiration from the
infernal way of reading the back-to-earth strategy of the Commedia. They all firmly set
their narratives within history, the ruinously warring world of the modem Here and Now.
Even Weiss, with his paradisial inclinations, refuses to succumb to the tempting fantasy
of anagogic release from time. Like Levi and Wajda, he has no ready answers for the
conundrums raised by the absurdly unfinalized “Final Solution” : why some inmates
survived while others perished; why some Nazis killed out of duty while others killed out
o f passion; why some victims colluded with their oppressors while others resisted the
entire system o f oppression. Common to all three retracers o f the Holocaust is an
openness to the Commedia as a source of typological parallels with powerful tropological
perspectives. But even as their allusions to Ulysses or Lucy or Cacciaguida serve to map
out potential domains o f moral understanding onto which the muddle of political
misunderstandings and distorted personal memories of the Holocaust can be projected
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and even clarified, their literary or cinematic alignments with Dante do not result in the
formulation of ultimate answers or the establishment of absolute certainties to end the
restless process o f recollecting, re-enacting, redressing.

■

When Levi, Wajda, and Weiss turn most compellingly to Dante, the prototypical
poet o f heteroglossia, it is to help them find a voice or a chorus of voices to match the
specific discursive objectives of their very different projects. Their engagement with the
Commedia as a vast echo-chamber of dramatically distinctive voices seems to have
empowered their own voices or the voices of their characters—Levi sounding through
Ulysses, Michal reciting like Casella, Weiss’s witnesses speaking truth like the chorus of
the Just—when what they had to say might easily have been lost amid the din of denials
and dismissals stirred up after the War. Dante had famously made his own voice heard
above the slanders of his false friends and political enemies, and his astounding success in
making his “dolce melodia” (even with its “senso duro”) resound through the centuries—
despite his identity-annihilating exile—can only have boosted the morale of modem
exiles seeking to unlock their tongues and sharpen their visions of what had happened in
the Warsaw Ghetto or behind the barricades at Auschwitz. Though Levi, Wajda, and
Weiss never presumed to speak as the New Dante for the Modern Age, they all used the
Old Dante as a time-tested amplifier of their outrage against injustice.
Throughout Se Questo E un Uomo, as the title itself would have us predict, Levi
broods over the Dantean (and Augustinian and Aristotelian and Mosaic) questions of
what constitutes the essence of human nature. It is usually framed as an old-fashioned
scholastic question for first-year philosophy students, the ready-made answer being
“rationality.” While Aristotle’s Man was a rational animal, Dante’s spin on the ready
made answer— “compagnevole animale” [companiable animal] (Convivio 4.4) —reveals
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his convivial belief that human nature cannot be rational unless it is sociable. For a
survivor of Auschwitz, however, the definition of human nature had once been and must
forever be an anxious concern at the deepest level of social and personal identity
formation. Only in the last chapter of the memoir does Levi permit himself to ponder the
evidence for a nature once human but reduced by the antisocial society of the camps to a
status lower than subhuman. What constitutes the essence of inhuman nature? His
answer is far from abstract:
È uomo chi uccide, è uomo chi fa o subisce ingiustizia; non è uomo chi, perso
ogni ritegno, divide il letto con un cadavere. Chi ha atteso che il suo vicino
finisse di morire per togliergli un quarto di pane, è, pur senza sua colpa, più
lontano dal modello dell’uomo pensante, che il più rozzo pigmeo e il sadico
più atroce. (Se Questo 152)
[It is man who kills, man who creates or suffers injustice^it is no longer man
who, having lost all restraint, shares his bed with a corpse. Whoever waits for
his neighbour to die in order to take his piece of bread is, albeit guiltless,
further from the model of thinking man than the most primitive pigmy or the
most vicious sadist.] (Woolf 171-2)
By surviving Auschwitz, by being in the Ka-Be at the end o f the war, and by forming a
friendship with Charles, Levi sets himself apart from the prisoner who “divide il letto con
un cadavere” or “ha atteso che il suo vicino finisse di morire per togliergli un quarto di
pane.” This separation allows Levi to remain as the “uomo pensante.” Dante-poet
identifies himself also as a “uomo pensante” when, at the beginning o f Inferno, he
describes how he could not climb the hill because of a weak left foot. The left foot
represents the will in Augustinian psychology whereas the right foot represents the
intellect (Singleton 9). While Dante’s will is in need of help, his intellect remains intact,
and since he never loses “il ben de l’intelletto” [the good of the intellect] {Inf. 3.18), he
can travel through the afterlife as a “uomo pensante" and return to give a trustworthy
account of his experiences. Levi’s fervent identification with Dante’s sociable “thinking
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man” must have affected his reading of Inferno, highlighting for him the many passages
where the pilgrim is forced to confront, as a transfixed eye-witness, the transformation of
the Damned into creatures less than human. While it is ultimately Levi who finds his
own voice and expresses his own thoughts on what a man is and is not within the
destruction system of the Nazi regime, his testimony draws on Dante’s hyperbolic
examples of degenerate humanity (such as Nimrod or Myrrha) in order to construct more
credible images o f demolished men and women from his memories of the inhuman
“society” of Auschwitz.
The Dantean voice Wajda takes from the Commedia is not that of a philosopher
concerned with the destruction of the man’s soul or will, but that of a political activist or
prophet preoccupied with national unity and social reform. Dante meditates frequently on
the political state o f Italy and Florence and how the city and country are slowly being
destroyed by internal and external enemies. He warns the reader through his political
laments about the factionalization of civic life that Italy is headed for certain destruction
unless concord can be established between Church and Empire. Wajda cannot rewrite
history; the Warsaw Uprising was not successful. He chose to present this failure in the
final scenes of Kanal when the members of the platoon do not successfully escape the
sewers. According to Michalek, Wajda’s films “tried to mesh individual experience with
the mechanism of the community’s destinies and, in doing so, carved out a new place for
the cinema” (13). Wajda’s hopes for national unity led him to remind Poland (where the
Commedia is routinely taught to school children) that Dante had anticipated not only his
call for resistance to brutal imperialism but also his vision of a successful nation where
justice would ensure the reign of peace. Hence the purgatorial glimmers of hope that
shine through the darkness of the sewers: if the fugitives can see the light even at the
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point o f death— as Manfred and Buonconte did on their remote battlefields—then surely
the Poles will not succumb to despair in the aftermath of their failed Uprising.
Weiss’s choice to structure Die Ermittlung after Paradiso seems the most
problematic of the three engagements with the Commedia considered in this study. When
Weiss’s concern for justice is taken into account, however, the choice of Paradiso is no
longer so difficult to understand. Weiss explained at the beginning of the play that it was
not meant as a further way to condemn the defendants: they had already been sentenced.
The success of der Auschwitz-Prozess itself was far from assured, however, and the
defendants often received minor sentences which hardly seemed to fit either the startling
number or the heinous character o f their crimes. Paradiso is one long meditation on
justice: who should administer it; how it should be administered; and how much of it
should be served on earth and beyond. Weiss adopts the voice of Dante-poet not just to
raise these questions, but to investigate and ascertain the long-range significance o f the
Prozess even when its short-term success was proving dubious at best. While the
defendants are given the last word in the play and laugh mockingly at the witnesses,
Weiss suggests that the defendants will have to answer for their crimes again in another
world, a world more equipped to deal with the perpetrators of genocide. Perhaps that
world will be only an imaginary one, a provisional theatrical space, rather than a
gloriously revealed Empyrean; but at least it will be opened up as a realm where the quest
for justice cannot be shut down by an arbitrary Statute of Limitations.
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